Granular Comparative Advantage*

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Abstract

Large firms play a pivotal role in international trade, shaping the export patterns of countries. We propose and quantify a granular multi-sector model of trade, which combines fundamental comparative advantage across sectors with granular comparative advantage embodied in outstanding individual firms. We develop an SMM-based estimation procedure, which takes full account of the general equilibrium of the model, to jointly estimate these fundamental and granular forces using French micro-data with information on firm domestic and export sales across manufacturing industries. We find that granularity accounts for about 20% of the variation in realized export intensity across sectors, and is more pronounced in the most export-intensive sectors. We then extend the model to a dynamic environment featuring both granular and fundamental shocks that jointly shape the time-series evolution of comparative advantage. We find a large role of granular forces in shaping comparative advantage reversals observed in the data.

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1 Introduction

Firms play a pivotal role in international trade. A significant share of exports is done by a small number of large firms, which enjoy substantial market power across destination countries. The fates of these large firms shape, in part, the countries’ trade patterns. For instance, Nokia in Finland or the Intel plant in Costa Rica have profoundly altered the specialization and export intensity of these countries. The importance of large firms is also reflected in trade and industrial policies that are often so narrow that they appear tailor-made to target individual firms rather than industries. In particular, antitrust regulation, antidumping policies, and international sanctions all target large individual foreign firms.

In this paper, we study the role of individual firms in determining the comparative advantage of countries. We aim to measure what part of comparative advantage can be traced to characteristics that are common to all firms in a given sector — such as the availability of specific human capital, infrastructure, and technology — versus idiosyncratic contribution of individual firms, driven by their idiosyncratic know-how and managerial talent. We call the former Fundamental Comparative Advantage (FCA) and the latter Granular Comparative Advantage (GCA). We set out to measure the contribution of GCA to international trade flows, thus revisiting the fundamental questions in international trade: what goods do countries trade and what is the source of a country’s comparative advantage?

The decomposition between FCA and GCA is perhaps best illustrated in terms of counterfactuals. Suppose, for instance, that a given firm and its technological know-how disappear. How does the export stance of the sector change? If comparative advantage is only shaped by sector-level characteristics, it does not change — other domestic firms in the sector expand, or enter, to absorb the market share of the exiting firm. This is the neoclassical benchmark, which abstracts from individual firms altogether and focuses on sectoral technologies and supplies of factors. However, if comparative advantage is in part driven by the performance of individual

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1In their “Export superstars” paper, Freund and Pierola (2015) find that a single largest exporting firm accounts for 17% of total manufacturing exports, on average across 32 developing and middle-income countries in their dataset. In the French manufacturing dataset used in this paper, the largest firm accounts for 7% of all manufacturing exports, and within 4-digit industries the largest firm accounts on average for 28% of the industry exports.

2In Costa Rica, Intel decided to close its microchip plant and move it to Asia in 2014. The electronics sector represented a steady 27% of Costa-Rican exports until 2013, yet starting 2015 it fell to just 8%. In Finland, Nokia at its peak in the mid-2000s enjoyed a 25% share of total Finnish exports, a 3.7% share of Finnish GDP, and a 39% share of the global mobile phone market, before collapsing following the smartphone revolution launched by Apple, and being eventually bought-out by Microsoft in 2013.

3Recent examples of international antitrust regulations are the 2007 case of the European Commission (EC) against Microsoft Corporation and the 2017 fine imposed by the EC on Google. A very recent case of a granular trade war is the 292% tariff imposed by the US on a particular jet produced by the Canadian Bombardier. “Granular” tactics are particularly widespread in antidumping retaliation (see Blonigen and Prusa 2008) and international sanctions (as in the recent case of the US against the Chinese ZTE). For a recent theoretical and empirical analysis of granular international lobbying see Blanga-Gubbay, Conconi, and Parenti (2020).
firms, then the export stance of the sector will change as the firm disappears with its specific strengths. In this world, the firm’s market share is taken over by other domestic firms that contribute differently to export patterns, or even by foreign firms. FCA and GCA also have different implications for the evolution of comparative advantage over time. If comparative advantage comes in part from GCA, standard firm dynamics — whereby individual firms gain and lose market shares against other domestic firms — result in changing sectoral exports, even without sectoral shocks.

We begin by formalizing the concept of granular comparative advantage in Section 2, where we also discuss possible approaches to its identification in the data. We present suggestive empirical evidence that granularity may be at play in shaping sectoral trade flows. To proxy for sectoral granularity, we adopt a measure of concentration of domestic sales among domestic firms. This measure identifies sectors with unusually large home firms without being directly affected by the international competitiveness of the sector. We show that this measure of within-sector domestic concentration is systematically correlated with aggregate sectoral exports, both in the cross-section and in the time series.

To go further and quantify the importance of granular comparative advantage, we adopt a structural identification approach. In Section 3, we develop and characterize a model of granular trade, which we later quantify and use for counterfactual analysis. Our model of granular trade contrasts with the bulk of the international trade literature, which maintains the assumption that sectors are comprised of a continuum of firms, each firm being infinitesimal. Under this continuum assumption, the productivity of any individual firm is inconsequential for sectoral trade patterns. Indeed, such continuous models are equivalent in the aggregate to a neoclassical Ricardian model that focuses on sector-level technologies and fully abstracts from modeling individual firms (e.g., as demonstrated in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare 2012, henceforth ACR).

We propose an alternative multi-sector granular model of trade, which acknowledges a finite number of firms operating in each sector, with the largest firm often claiming a massive share of the market. Under these circumstances, realized sectoral productivities, and hence the comparative advantage of a country, are shaped in part by the idiosyncratic productivity draws of individual firms, which do not average out at the sectoral level. Formally, our model combines Ricardian comparative advantage across sectors, as in Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977; henceforth DFS), with the Melitz (2003) model of firm heterogeneity within sectors, in which we relax the assumption of a continuum of firms, following Eaton, Kortum, and Sotelo (2012; henceforth EKS). This allows the model to simultaneously nest fundamental and granular comparative advantage in a unified framework.

We estimate the model in Section 4, using firm-level data on domestic and export sales
of French firms across 119 4-digit manufacturing industries. We use a simulated method of moments (SMM) estimation procedure which takes full account of the general equilibrium of our granular model. The extent of firm concentration — hence the potential for granularity — is disciplined by targeting moments on the number of firms and the market share of top firms across industries. Comparative advantage is revealed using export and import intensity of sectors. To disentangle the relative roles of fundamental and granular forces in driving comparative advantage, we use moments of the joint distribution of sectoral trade flows and within-sector domestic sales concentration. Intuitively, sectors in which export intensity is high due to GCA are expected to feature firms-outliers relative to other domestic firms, large enough to drive aggregate sectoral productivity. Despite its parsimony, the estimated granular model is successful at reproducing the rich cross-sectoral heterogeneity of the data.

We use the estimated model in Section 5 to quantify the importance of granularity in shaping sectoral trade outcomes, using counterfactual analysis. We find a significant part of trade flows to be of a granular origin (around 20%), and that the contribution of granularity is particularly pronounced in the most export-intensive sectors — the export champions of the country. Among the top 10% export-intensive sectors, our results suggest that nearly one third of exports is of granular origin. We also show that, in a granular world, conventional inference of fundamental sectoral productivities based on sectoral export shares leads to biased estimates.

Importantly, we establish the robustness of our results to alternative parameterizations of the model and distributional assumptions. We find that parameterizations that still match our key identifying moments lead to similar quantitative conclusions on the importance of granularity. Conversely, alternative parameterizations, such as ones with a thinner-tailed firm productivity distribution, are unable to match the data. This emphasizes the importance of the empirical moments, relative to the assumed functional forms, in delivering the identification in our structural framework.

Having established the contribution of granularity to long-run trade patterns using our static model, we explore in Section 6 its dynamic implications. In particular, we study the ability of granular forces to explain and predict the evolution and reversals in comparative advantage of countries. To this end, we extend our granular model to feature industry dynamics, driven simultaneously by sector-level and firm-level productivity shocks. We calibrate the dynamic productivity processes to match the mean-reversion of domestic firm sales shares and sectoral exports. We find that granular forces account for 25% of the year-to-year changes in sectoral export shares. Furthermore, the dynamic granular model is consistent both with the hyper-specialization of countries in a few industries at any given point in time and a relatively fast mean reversion in comparative advantage over time, emphasized in a recent paper by Hanson, Lind, and Muendler (2016; henceforth HLM). We find that idiosyncratic firm pro-
ductivity dynamics alone accounts for about a half of comparative advantage reversals for the most export-intensive sectors.

Finally, an important implication of the dynamic model is that empirical proxies of sectoral granularity are strong predictors of mean reversion in sectoral export patterns. Sections 6.3 tests this prediction in the data. We find that domestic sales concentration at the top, a proxy for granularity, not only correlates contemporaneously with the aggregate sectoral exports, but is also a predictor of future changes in sectoral exports. We view this empirical pattern as strongly suggestive of the granular mechanism of the type modeled in this paper. We conclude the paper with a discussion of granular policies in Section 7 and final remarks in Section 8.

**Related literature** The term *granularity* has been coined in the macroeconomics literature, which following Gabaix (2011) has focused on the study of aggregate fluctuations driven by idiosyncratic productivity shocks (see e.g. Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi 2012, Carvalho and Gabaix 2013, Carvalho and Grassi 2019, Grassi 2017). The aggregate volatility consequences of granularity in an open economy have been studied by di Giovanni and Levchenko (2012) and di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Méjean (2014). Instead of aggregate volatility, we focus here on sectoral trade patterns, where the granular forces must be at least as prominent, since granularity is particularly pronounced within sectors.

In terms of modeling, we borrow from the recent trade literature, and in particular from EKS. EKS tackle a very different set of issues in the context of a single-sector model, such as explaining the prevalence of zeros in aggregate trade flows, while we develop a multi-sector environment to explore the implications of granularity for a country’s comparative advantage. In terms of the question studied, our paper therefore contributes to the empirical trade literature on the structure and evolution of comparative advantage, e.g. Chor (2010), Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer (2012), Freund and Pierola (2015), Sutton and Trefler (2016), Levchenko and Zhang (2016), and HLM.

For our analysis, we adopt a model of oligopolistic competition with variable markups, which has been used in a number of papers studying the behavior of markups, prices and market shares in an open economy (see e.g. Atkeson and Burstein 2008, Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings 2014, 2019, Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu 2015, Hottman, Redding, and Weinstein 2015). Grassi (2017) also studies oligopolistic competition in a granular setting. We follow Neary (2010, 2016) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010) in studying an open economy oligopolistic environment with firms that are big in the small (at the sectoral level), but small in the big

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4Building on these insights, Gabaix and Koijen (2020) propose a way to construct a granular instrumental variable, which can be used to isolate the causal effects of aggregate economic shocks.

5In the context of import sourcing, Head, Jing, and Ries (2017) study the role of granularity of buyers in explaining hierarchy violations.
(at the economy-wide level). More generally, see Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2018) for a recent review of the empirical and theoretical literature on the role of individual firms in international trade. Our study is also related to the vast literature on trade policy and market structure, summarized in Helpman and Krugman (1989) and Bagwell and Staiger (2004).

2 Granular Comparative Advantage: Definition

In order to quantify fundamental and granular comparative advantage empirically, we introduce a formal definition of these concepts, and discuss possible approaches to their identification.

**Definition** Consider the export intensity of a sector \( z \), that is the ratio of sectoral exports \( X_z \) to domestic expenditure (absorption) \( Y_z \). We denote it by \( \Lambda_z \equiv X_z / Y_z \). It is an intuitive measure of comparative advantage that maps into alternative definitions across a range of international trade models. Mechanically, it can be decomposed into the sum of the contributions to exports of all firms in the sector:

\[
\Lambda_z = \sum_i s_{z,i} \lambda_{z,i} = s_z' \lambda_z,
\]

where \( s_{z,i} \equiv d_{z,i} / Y_z \) is the firm-level domestic market share, \( \lambda_{z,i} \equiv x_{z,i} / d_{z,i} \) is the firm-level export intensity, and \((\lambda_z, s_z)\) is the corresponding vector notation. We treat the observed market shares and export intensities in sector \( z \) as a realization of a stochastic data-generating process (DGP): \((\lambda_z, s_z) \sim F_z(\cdot)\). The distribution function \( F_z(\cdot) \) embodies the characteristics of sector \( z \) in a given country that are a priori accessible to all firms in the sector.

We are interested in decomposing the aggregate outcome \( \Lambda_z \), itself a random variable, into its expected level based on sectoral characteristics and the idiosyncratic contribution of individual firms:

\[
\Lambda_z = \Phi_z + \Gamma_z, \quad \text{where} \quad \Phi_z \equiv \mathbb{E}_z \{ \Lambda_z \} = \int (s' \lambda) \, dF_z(\lambda, s).
\]

Thus, we define fundamental comparative advantage (FCA), denoted \( \Phi_z \), as the population mean of the export intensity given the sectoral characteristics embodied in \( F_z(\cdot) \). In contrast, granular comparative advantage (GCA), denoted \( \Gamma_z \), is a granular residual that captures small sample departures from this population mean. It is driven by idiosyncratic firm outcomes in

\[\text{Note the relationship to the macroeconomics granularity literature, which focuses on the decomposition of the aggregate growth rate } G_t \text{ into idiosyncratic growth rates } g_{i,t} \text{ (in place of the sectoral and firm-level export intensities, } \Lambda_z \text{ and } \lambda_{z,i} \text{ respectively), and often takes market shares as exogenously given.}\]

\[\text{In the structural model that we set up in Section 3, } \Phi_z \text{ is not only the population mean of } \Lambda_z, \text{ but also its limit in the continuous limit of the model, as the number of firms per sector becomes infinite (and thereby } \Gamma_z \to 0).\]
industries with a finite number of firms. We write the granular residual as follows:

\[ \Gamma_z = \sum_i s_{z,i} \lambda_{z,i} - \int (s' \lambda) \, dF_z(\lambda, s). \]

The granular residual is mean zero, by construction, as a difference between a random variable and its conditional mean. As a consequence, FCA and GCA are orthogonal in the cross section of sectors \( z \), and the following variance decomposition of export intensity across sectors holds:

\[ \text{var}(\Lambda_z) = \text{var}(\Phi_z) + \text{var}(\Gamma_z). \]

One goal of this paper is to quantify this variance decomposition, hence the respective contribution of GCA and FCA to comparative advantage, both in levels and in changes over time.

**Identification** If one could observe counterfactual realizations of sectors with fixed \( F_z(\cdot) \), \( \Phi_z \) would be estimated by the average export intensity of the sector while \( \Gamma_z \) would change realization-to-realization. In principle, therefore, one could make inference on sectoral FCA and GCA directly from the data, if one could observe a large number of realizations of sectoral outcomes given a stable DGP \( F_z(\cdot) \), over a range of sectors. In each sector, the average realization then approximates FCA, while GCA is the distance between realization and average. In practice, however, such inference is rarely feasible as \( F_z(\cdot) \) likely varies both in the cross-section of country-sectors as well as within country-sector over time (\( F_{z,t}(\cdot) \) in this case). Separating out small-sample deviations from changes in fundamentals \( F_z(\cdot) \) across sectors or time is challenging empirically, absent natural experiment that shifts idiosyncratic firm productivities without affecting fundamentally sectoral characteristics.\(^8\)

To make progress on this issue, we adopt a structural approach. That is, we reduce the dimensionality of the problem by parameterizing the data generating process \( F_z(\cdot) \) and its variation across sectors. Specifically, we use a general equilibrium economic model for market shares and export intensities, \( \{\lambda_{z,i}, s_{z,i}\} \), as described in Section 3. Our model is closely related to workhorse international trade models, with the important difference that we relax the assumption that firms in each sector form a continuum, thereby allowing individual firms to impact sectoral outcomes. We estimate the model using moments from the data that summarize variation across sectors in both sector-level and firm-level outcomes. Once estimated, the model can be simulated many times with the same DGP, which allows to quantify the relative importance of granular and fundamental forces as discussed above. Importantly, we

\(^8\)Possible empirical strategies along these lines could be for example to take the death of a CEO as a shock to a firm (see e.g. Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon 2010), but these strategies appear too limited in scope to conduct the analysis systematically, as we set out to do here.
show that this quantification is robust to a set of alternative parametric assumptions, so long as the model matches the set of identifying moments in the data.

**Empirical patterns** Before delving into the structural framework in the next section, we look at the data for patterns that are suggestive of the granular mechanism. The empirical regularities documented here are then used in the structural estimation of Section 4 to help identify the model parameters that govern the relative intensity of GCA and FCA.

If granular forces are at play, one would expect that the presence of a few unusually large firms within a sector (relative to other domestic firms) correlates with the aggregate export intensity of the sector. To detect such patterns, we regress log sectoral exports on the concentration ratio of domestic sales among the top-3 domestic firms, controlling for the size of the domestic market:

\[
\log X_z = \alpha + \beta \sum_{i=1}^{3} \tilde{s}_{z,(i)} + \log D_z + \epsilon_z, \tag{1}
\]

where \(D_z\) are total domestic sales of all domestic firms in sector \(z\) and \(\tilde{s}_{z,(i)} \equiv d_{z,(i)}/D_z\) is the relative domestic sales share of the \(i\)th largest firm in the domestic market. We use \(\sum_{i=1}^{3} \tilde{s}_{z,(i)}\) as our granular proxy. Note that this measure is not mechanically correlated with comparative advantage, as it relies solely on the relative domestic sales of domestic firms among all domestic firms in the domestic market.\(^9\) To estimate (1), we use French firm-level manufacturing data on domestic sales and exports, \(\{d_{z,i}, x_{z,i}\}\), which we aggregate to obtain sectoral \(D_z\) and \(X_z\). The data includes 300 NACE 4-digit sectors with an average of 290 firms per sector.

We report the results of several specifications in Table 1. The first two columns use the 2005 cross-section (our benchmark year for estimation), and show that a 10 percentage point greater top-3 sales share in the domestic market is associated with a 9 log points increase in aggregate sectoral exports. This relationship holds controlling for 2-digit sectoral fixed-effects (column 2). This relationship also holds more generally in the panel between 1997 and 2008, with year fixed effects and with and without 2-digit sectoral fixed effects (columns 3–4). The resulting estimates are almost the same as in the 2005 cross-section.

These cross-sectional results are consistent with granularity shaping, in part, trade patterns, as the relative size of large firms within sectors is predictive of aggregate sectoral exports. However, they leave room for alternative interpretations. For instance, it could be that sectors with a high dispersion in productivity across firms happen to be those in which France has comparative advantage (for a microfoundation, see e.g. Bonfiglioli, Crinò, and Gancia 2018). We partly address this concern by controlling for 2-digit fixed effects, aimed to group together sectors with similar technological and skill requirements. To explore this further, we

\(^9\)In Appendix Table A1, we also report similar regressions using top-1 concentration \(\tilde{s}_{z,(1)}\), instead of \(\sum_{i=1}^{3} \tilde{s}_{z,(i)}\), which result in the same quantitative patterns with somewhat less precisely estimated coefficients.
Table 1: Granularity and exports

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sum_{i=1}^{3} \tilde{s}_{z,(i)}$</td>
<td>0.860*** (0.297)</td>
<td>0.908*** (0.303)</td>
<td>0.903*** (0.308)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\log D_z$</td>
<td>0.897*** (0.051)</td>
<td>0.938*** (0.053)</td>
<td>0.907*** (0.052)</td>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2-digit</th>
<th>2-digit</th>
<th>4-digit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td># obs.</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>3,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>$R^2_{adj}$</td>
<td>0.518</td>
<td>0.620</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.649</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data and variables described in the text; standard errors in brackets, *** indicates significance at 1%-level. Specification (5) contains a full set of 300 sectoral fixed effects and uses time-series variation over 1997–2008; specifications (6)–(7) are in first differences, namely regress $\Delta \log X_{z,t}$ on $\Delta \sum_{i=1}^{3} \tilde{s}_{z,(i),t}$ over 1998–2008.

also run a specification that exploits within-sector variation over time. Column 5 re-runs the panel specification, which in addition to time fixed effects now includes a full set of 4-digit industry fixed effects; columns 6 and 7 estimate the specification in first differences, regressing the change in log sectoral exports on the change in the top-3 share, year-to-year in our panel. We again find a notable statistical association between the granular proxy and aggregate sectoral exports. Sectors where top French firms increase their relative dominance in the domestic market also see an improvement in their aggregate export stance: a 10 percentage point increase in the top-3 concentration ratio is associated with a 5% (log points) increase in the sectoral exports.

Overall, these results provide strong suggestive evidence in favor of the granular mechanism. We later build on these empirical patterns, together with other moments in the data, to estimate the granular trade model that we now introduce.

### 3 A Granular Model of Trade

This section sets up the granular trade model, giving rise to the structural DGP discussed in the previous section. We use this model to explore the quantitative implications of granularity for trade patterns. It is a two-country multi-sector model, which features Ricardian DFS forces across sectors and an EKS model of granular firms within each sector. It therefore combines fundamental comparative advantage of sectors and granular comparative advantage arising from idiosyncratic productivity draws of individual firms within sectors. In the limit where firms become infinitesimal, granularity is shut off and the model converges to a multi-sector Melitz (2003) model (see Appendix B.1). We start with a static version of the model and make the model dynamic in Section 6.

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3.1 Model setup

Preferences  There is a unit continuum of sectors \( z \in [0, 1] \). Households in each country have the same Cobb-Douglas preferences over the consumption of sectoral output \( \{Q_z\} \):

\[
Q = \exp \left\{ \int_0^1 \alpha_z \log Q_z \, dz \right\},
\]

where \( \{\alpha_z\}_{z\in[0,1]} \) are non-negative preference parameters, which satisfy \( \int_0^1 \alpha_z \, dz = 1 \), and determine the shares of household income spent on consumption across sectors.

Within each sector, there is a finite number of product varieties \( i \in \{1, \ldots, K_z\} \), which are combined into aggregate sectoral output using a CES aggregator:

\[
Q_z = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{K_z} q_{z,i}^{\sigma-1} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}},
\]

where \( \sigma > 1 \) is the within-sector elasticity of substitution, common across sectors. The \( K_z \) product varieties available for consumption in the home market can be of both domestic and foreign origin. In the foreign market, there are \( K_z^* \) product varieties available for consumption, which are in general different from the set of varieties marketed at home. In what follows, starred variables correspond to the foreign market.

With this demand structure, the home consumer expenditure on variety \( i \) in sector \( z \) is:

\[
r_{z,i} \equiv p_{z,i} q_{z,i} = s_{z,i} \alpha_z Y \quad \text{with} \quad s_{z,i} \equiv \left( \frac{p_{z,i}}{P_z} \right)^{1-\sigma},
\]

where \( p_{z,i} \) is the price and \( s_{z,i} \) is the within-sector market share of the product variety, and \( Y \) is aggregate income (expenditure) in the home market. The expressions in (4) derive from the fact that with Cobb-Douglas preferences, consumers spend a constant share \( \alpha_z \) of their income \( Y \) on purchasing varieties in sector \( z \) (i.e., \( P_z Q_z = \alpha_z Y \)), and within sector \( z \) the CES demand for variety \( i \) is given by \( q_{z,i} = (p_{z,i}/P_z)^{-\sigma} Q_z \). The sectoral price index \( P_z \) satisfies:

\[
P_z = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{K_z} p_{z,i}^{1-\sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}.
\]

The home and foreign households supply respectively \( L \) and \( L^* \) units of labor inelastically, with \( L/L^* \) measuring the relative size of the home country.

Production technology  Each product variety is supplied by an individual firm with productivity \( \varphi_{z,i} \) (\( \varphi_{z,i}^* \), respectively, if the firm is foreign). Products are produced in their market of origin, and firms have access to a CRS production technology, which uses local labor, \( y_{z,i} = \varphi_{z,i} \ell_{z,i} \). The output of the firm can be marketed domestically and exported. Exporting
is associated with an iceberg trade cost $\tau \geq 1$, that is $\tau$ units of product need to be shipped for one unit to arrive at the foreign market. Therefore, the marginal cost of supplying the home market is constant and equal to:

$$c_{z,i} = \begin{cases} 
  \frac{w}{\varphi_{z,i}}, & \text{if } i \text{ is a home variety,} \\
  \frac{\tau w^{*}}{\varphi_{z,i}^{*}}, & \text{if } i \text{ is a foreign variety,} 
\end{cases}$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

where $w$ and $w^{*}$ are respectively the home and foreign wage rates. The marginal cost of serving the foreign market is defined symmetrically, and we denote it with $c_{z,i}^{*}$.

Furthermore, there is a fixed market access cost $F$ in local units of labor, which is independent of the origin of the firm, i.e. applies both for local firms and exporters. As a result, the differential selection of domestic and foreign firms into the local market is driven by iceberg trade costs, rather than by a differential fixed access cost. In each market, we sort all potential entrants in the increasing order of marginal cost $c_{z,i}$ ($c_{z,i}^{*}$ in foreign, respectively). The index $i$ refers to the marginal cost ranking of a firm in a given market, so that the same firm is in general represented by different indexes in different markets.

**Productivity draws** We denote with $M_{z}$ a potential (shadow) number of domestic products in sector $z$. $M_{z}$ is the realization of a Poisson random variable with parameter $\bar{M}_{z}$, so that $\mathbb{E}(M_{z}) = \bar{M}_{z}$. Each of the $M_{z}$ potential entrants takes an *iid* productivity draw from a Pareto distribution with a shape parameter $\theta$ and lower bound $\varphi_{z}$.\(^{11}\) Lower $\theta$ corresponds to a more dispersed and skewed distribution of productivity draws, which increases the strength of the granular forces in the model, as we discuss below. We borrow this structure of productivity draws from the earlier work of Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and EKS. It results both in a tractable model environment and in a realistic cross-sectional distribution of firm sales. In Section 5, we explore robustness to an alternative log-normal statistical process for firm productivity draws.

With the Poisson-Pareto productivity structure, the combined parameter:

$$T_{z} \equiv \bar{M}_{z} \cdot \varphi_{z}^{\theta}$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

is a sufficient statistic that determines the expected productivity of a sector.\(^{12}\) Intuitively, a

\(^{11}\)Formally, the realized number of products $M_{z}$ has the pdf $\mathbb{P}\{M_{z} = m\} = e^{-\bar{M}_{z}} \frac{\bar{M}_{z}^{m}}{m!}$ for $m = 0, 1, 2,$ ..., while the cdf of productivity draws $\varphi$ is given by $G_{z}(\varphi) = 1 - (\varphi_{z}/\varphi)^{\theta}$.

\(^{12}\)In particular, EKS show that the number of productivity draws above any given $\varphi > \varphi_{z}$ is a Poisson random variable with a mean parameter $T_{z} \varphi^{-\theta}$, increasing in $T_{z}$ and decreasing in $\varphi$. As long as the least efficient product stays inactive in equilibrium, the model is invariant to various combinations of $\bar{M}_{z}$ and $\varphi_{z}$, which result in the same $T_{z}$. A convenient limiting case with $\bar{M}_{z} \to \infty$ and $\varphi_{z} \to 0$ (holding $T_{z}$ constant) ensures that there is always a sufficient number of draws and the least productive draw is necessarily inactive.
sector is more productive either if there are more potential entrants (i.e., productivity draws), equal to \( \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \varphi_z \), or if the average productivity of a potential entrant is high, which is given by \( \bar{M}_z \).

The pool of foreign potential products and the ensuing productivity draws are obtained in a symmetric way, with country-sector-specific parameters \( \bar{M}_z^* \) and \( \varphi_z^* \), resulting in a sufficient statistic for the expected sectoral productivity \( T_z^* = \bar{M}_z^* \varphi_z^* \). The ratio \( T_z / T_z^* \) varies across sectors \( z \) and determines the expected relative productivity of the two countries, and thus is a measure of the home’s fundamental comparative advantage. \( T_z / T_z^* \) is the only source of comparative advantage in the continuous DFS-Melitz limit of the model (see Appendix B.1).

**Market structure** For a given set of \( K_z \) entrants, the firms play a Bertrand oligopolistic price setting game, similar to Atkeson and Burstein (2008). Specifically, firm \( i \in \{1, ..., K_z\} \) chooses its prices \( p_{z,i} \), taking as given the prices of its competitors \( \{p_{z,j}\}_{j \neq i} \), to maximize its profits from serving the home market:

\[
\Pi_{z,i} = \max_{p_{z,i}} \left\{ (p_{z,i} - c_{z,i}) \frac{p_{z,i}^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j=1}^{K_z} p_{z,j}^{1-\sigma}} \alpha_z Y - w F \right\},
\]

where we used the expressions for the market share of the firm (4) and the sectoral price index (5). While firms are large within their industries, and hence internalize their effect on the sectoral price index (5), they are still infinitesimal at the level of the whole economy, since the model features a continuum of sectors, different from EKS. Therefore, firms take wage rates \( w \) and \( w^* \) as given, and hence treat \( c_{z,i} \) as exogenous to their decisions.

The solution to this Bertrand-Nash competition game is a markup price setting rule:

\[
p_{z,i} = \frac{\varepsilon_{z,i}}{\varepsilon_{z,i} - 1} \cdot c_{z,i}, \quad \text{where} \quad \varepsilon_{z,i} \equiv \varepsilon(s_{z,i}) = \sigma(1 - s_{z,i}) + s_{z,i}, \tag{8}
\]

with the market share of the firm \( s_{z,i} \) defined in (4), and with \( \varepsilon_{z,i} \in [1, \sigma] \) measuring the effective elasticity of residual demand for the product of the firm. This elasticity decreases, and hence the markup \( \mu_{z,i} \equiv \frac{p_{z,i}}{c_{z,i}} = \frac{s_{z,i}}{\varepsilon_{z,i} - 1} \) increases, with the market share of the firm \( s_{z,i} \).

This contrasts with the constant-markup pricing under monopolistic competition in the continuous DFS-Melitz limit of the model.\(^{13}\)

To summarize, given the set of entrants and their marginal costs \( \{c_{z,i}\}_{i=1}^{K_z} \), the equilibrium

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\(^{13}\)Much of the earlier granularity literature (including Carvalho and Grassi 2014, di Giovanni and Levchenko 2012) adopts an ad hoc assumption of constant markups. The quantitative pricing-to-market literature following Atkeson and Burstein (2008) studies oligopolistic competition with variable markups, but adopts competition in quantities, which is qualitatively similar but results in greater markup variability (see discussion in Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings 2019). We adopt a more natural case of oligopolistic competition in prices, following EKS, which results in a less pronounced quantitative difference from the constant markup case.
in the Bertrand-Nash price setting game is a vector of prices and market shares \( \{ p_{z,i}, s_{z,i} \}^{K_z}_{i=1} \) and a sectoral price index \( P_z \), which solve the fixed point defined by (8), (4) and (5). While there is no analytical characterization of the resulting prices and market shares, the equilibrium is unique and has the property that prices \( p_{z,i} \) increase with marginal costs \( c_{z,i} \), while markups \( \mu_{z,i} = \frac{p_{z,i}}{c_{z,i}} \) and market shares \( s_{z,i} \) decrease with \( c_{z,i} \). Furthermore, the equilibrium firm profits from serving the home market are given by:

\[
\Pi_{z,i} \equiv \Pi_z(s_{z,i}) = \frac{s_{z,i}}{\varepsilon(s_{z,i})} \alpha_z Y - wF. \tag{9}
\]

Indeed, operating profits are a fraction \( \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{z,i}} = \frac{p_{z,i} - c_{z,i}}{p_{z,i}} \) of revenues (4), which equal the firm’s share of the sectoral expenditure in the market, \( s_{z,i} \alpha_z Y \). In equilibrium, firms with higher market shares command higher profits.

The price setting equilibrium in the foreign market is symmetric, resulting in prices, market shares and profits \( \{ p^*_z, s^*_z, \Pi^*_z \}^{K^*_z}_{i=1} \), given the set of entrants and their marginal costs \( \{ c^*_z,i \}^{K^*_z}_{i=1} \).

Due to linearity of the production function, each firm’s profit maximization problem is separable across markets, and hence can be considered one market at a time.

**Entry** An equilibrium of the entry game is achieved when for a subset of firms equilibrium profits given by (9) are non-negative, while for any additional entrant profits upon entry would be negative. With a discrete number of potential entrants, there may exist multiple equilibria in the entry game. We therefore consider a sequential entry game in each market separately. Specifically, firms with lower marginal costs of serving a given market, \( c_{z,i} \), move first. We assign the indexes \( i \) such that \( c_{z,1} \leq c_{z,2} \leq \ldots \), and hence firms with lower indexes \( i \) choose whether to enter first.\(^{14}\) With this equilibrium selection, the entry game has a unique cutoff equilibrium, so that only firms with marginal costs below some cutoff enter the market.

Formally, denote by \( s^*_{z,i} \) the market share of firm \( i \leq K_z \) resulting from the price-setting game when \( K_z \) firms choose to enter. The corresponding profits are given by \( \Pi^*_{z,i} = \Pi_z(s^*_{z,i}) \) defined in (9). We already know that, for a given \( K_z \), \( s^*_{z,i} \) is decreasing in \( i \). Furthermore, it is easy to verify that \( s^*_{z,i} \) is decreasing in \( K_z \) for all \( i \), that is \( s^*_{z,i} < s^*_{z,i+1} \) for all \( i \leq K_z \). Intuitively, the entry of any additional firm reduces market shares (and hence markups) of all existing firms. Therefore, since \( \Pi_z(s^*_{z,i}) \) is a monotonically increasing function of \( s^*_{z,i} \), there exists a unique \( K_z \) such that \( \Pi^*_{z,i} \geq 0 \) for all \( i \leq K_z \) and \( \Pi^*_{z,i} < 0 \) for all \( i > K_z \) and \( K > K_z \). This \( K_z \) is the equilibrium number of entrants, and \( c_{z,K_z} \) is the cutoff cost level. Note that, due to monotonicity, it is sufficient to find the unique \( K_z \) such that \( \Pi^*_{z,i,K_z} \geq 0 \) and \( \Pi^*_{z,i,K_z+1} < 0 \).

\(^{14}\)Note that index \( i \) is not a property of a firm, but rather of a firm-market pair. A firm is characterized by its origin and productivity draw \( \varphi \), and a given firm in general has different indexes \( i \) in the two markets.
**General equilibrium** is a vector of wage rates and incomes \((w, w^*, Y, Y^*)\), such that labor markets clear in both countries and aggregate incomes equal aggregate expenditures. In particular, in the home country

\[
Y = wL + \Pi, \tag{10}
\]

where \(\Pi\) are aggregate profits of all home firms distributed to home households:

\[
\Pi = \int_0^1 \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{K_z} t_{z,i} \Pi_z(s_{z,i}) + \sum_{i=1}^{K_z^*} (1 - t_{z,i}^*) \Pi_z^*(s_{z,i}^*) \right] dz, \tag{11}
\]

with profit function \(\Pi_z(s_{z,i})\) defined in (9) and \(t_{z,i}^* \in \{0, 1\}\) denoting the indicator for whether firm \(i\) in sector \(z\) in the domestic market is of local origin, and by analogy \(t_{z,i}^*\) for the foreign market. The equality between expenditure \(Y\) and income \(wL + \Pi\) implies home budget balance and hence trade balance. We normalize \(w = 1\) as numeraire and omit the foreign budget constraint by Walras’ law.

Labor market clearing requires that the aggregate labor income \(wL\) equals the total expenditure of all firms on domestic labor:

\[
wL = \int_0^1 \left[ \alpha_z Y \sum_{i=1}^{K_z} \frac{s_{z,i}}{\mu(s_{z,i})} + \alpha_z Y^* \sum_{i=1}^{K_z^*} (1 - t_{z,i}^*) \frac{s_{z,i}^*}{\mu(s_{z,i}^*)} + wFK_z \right] dz. \tag{12}
\]

The three terms on the right-hand side of (12) correspond to expenditure on domestic labor for (i) production for domestic market, (ii) production for foreign market, and (iii) entry of firms in the domestic market, respectively. Note that \(s_{z,i} \alpha_z Y/\mu(s_{z,i})\) is revenues from domestic sales (4) divided by markup \(\mu(s_{z,i})\), and hence equals variable costs, i.e. expenditure on production labor. Recall that the markup \(\mu(s_{z,i}) = \frac{\varepsilon_{z,i}}{\varepsilon_{z,i} - 1}\) with \(\varepsilon_{z,i}\) defined in (8). Furthermore, \(K_z\) is the total number of entrants, domestic and foreign, which all pay a fixed cost \(F\) in terms of domestic labor. A parallel market clearing condition to (12) holds in the foreign country.

Aggregate equilibrium conditions (10) and (12), together with their foreign counterparts, and under normalization \(w = 1\), allow to solve for the aggregate equilibrium vector \(X \equiv (w, w^*, Y, Y^*)\), given the sectoral equilibrium vector \(Z \equiv \{K_z, \{s_{z,i}\}_{i=1}^{K_z}, K_z^*, \{s_{z,i}^*\}_{i=1}^{K_z^*}\}_{z \in [0, 1]}\).\(^{15}\)

In turn, given the aggregate equilibrium vector \(X\), the solution to the entry and price-setting game in each country-sector yields the sectoral equilibrium vector \(Z\). The resulting fixed point \((X, Z)\) is the equilibrium in the granular economy.

\(^{15}\)One of the four aggregate equilibrium conditions is redundant by Walras Law, and is replaced by a numeraire normalization. Also note that in the closed economy conditions (10) and (12) are equivalent, and amount to \(Y/w = \bar{\mu}[L - FK]\), where \(K = \int_0^1 K_z dz\) is the total number of firms serving the home economy and \(\bar{\mu} = \left[ \int_0^1 \alpha_z \sum_{i=1}^{K_z} s_{z,i}/\mu(s_{z,i}) \right]^{-1}\) is the (harmonic) average markup.
3.2 Properties of the granular model

We note the relationship between this model and the conceptual granularity framework laid out in Section 2. Our structural model maps the statistical process for productivity draws \( \{ \varphi_{z,i} \}_{i=1}^{M_z} \) and \( \{ \varphi_{z,j}^* \}_{j=1}^{M_z^*} \) into firm-level and sectoral economic outcomes, such as firm market shares \( s_{z,i} \) and export shares \( \lambda_{z,i} \).\(^{16}\) Hence, given the productivity distribution and model parameters, this framework characterizes the structural data generating process denoted \( F_z(\cdot) \) in Section 2.

In the following sections, we use this granular model to quantify the role played by individual firms in shaping the comparative advantage of a country. To set the stage for this analysis, we now discuss the properties of the sectoral export share — a measure of the country’s comparative advantage in a given sector. The sectoral export share is the cumulative market share of all home firms in the foreign market in a given sector \( z \), and we denote it by:\(^{17}\)

\[
\Lambda_z^* \equiv \frac{X_z}{\alpha_z Y^*} = \sum_{i=1}^{K^*_z} (1 - \iota^*_z) s^*_{z,i}, \quad (13)
\]

where \( X_z \) is total home exports and \( \alpha_z Y^* \) is total foreign absorption in sector \( z \). By analogy, the foreign export share in sector \( z \) is given by \( \Lambda_z = X^*_z / (\alpha_z Y^*) \), where \( X^*_z \) denotes total home imports (foreign exports) in sector \( z \).

In the granular model, the realized foreign share is a random variable, which depends on the productivity of the home and foreign firms in sector \( z \). These productivity draws are shaped, in turn, by the fundamental comparative advantage of the sector, \( T_z / T^*_z \), and the idiosyncratic realizations of firm draws from the Poisson-Pareto process described above. The structure of the model provides a natural decomposition of the foreign share \( \Lambda_z \) into these fundamental and granular components. In particular, the expected foreign share, conditional on fundamental comparative advantage of the sector \( T_z / T^*_z \), is given by:\(^{18}\)

\[
\Phi_z \equiv \mathbb{E}_T \Lambda_z = \mathbb{E}\{ \Lambda_z | T_z / T^*_z \} = \frac{1}{1 + (\tau \omega)^{\theta} \cdot T_z / T^*_z}, \quad (14)
\]

\(^{16}\)Note that firm-i’s export share is simply the ratio of its sales in the two markets, \( \lambda_{z,i} = (s^*_{z,i} Y^*) / (s_{z,i} Y) \).

\(^{17}\)One minus the export (or foreign) share, \( 1 - \Lambda_z^* \), is the home share, which features prominently in the gains from trade literature (see ACR). Note the slight difference here with Section 2, where we normalized home exports by home absorption, rather than foreign absorption. The two measures of export shares differ by \( Y / Y^* \), which is constant across sectors, and hence does not affect cross-sectional variance decomposition.

\(^{18}\)This result applies despite the fact that market shares \( s_{z,i} \) are complex non-linear transformation of firm productivity draws \( \varphi_{z,i} \), which in particular depend on the endogenous markups \( \mu_{z,i} \) that do not admit an analytical characterization. Nonetheless, due to the Poisson-Pareto productivity structure and the common entry cost \( F \), the distribution of equilibrium market shares conditional on entry in a given market is the same for foreign and home firms. At the same time, the expected number of entrants differs for foreign and home firms, and its ratio is given by \( \Phi_z \). The formal derivation of (14) is provided in Appendix B.2.
and symmetrically $\Phi^*_z \equiv \mathbb{E}_T \Lambda^*_z = \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{\tau}{\omega} \right)^{\theta} \cdot \frac{T^*_z}{T_z} \right]^{-1}$ is the expected export share. The expected foreign share $\Phi_z$ decreases in all sectors in the trade cost $\tau$ and in the relative foreign wage rate $\omega \equiv w^*/w$. Across sectors, variation in $\Phi_z$ is shaped by the fundamental comparative advantage $T_z/T^*_z$. The expression in (14) is familiar from the quantitative trade literature, following Eaton and Kortum (2002), and it characterizes the realized trade shares in the continuous limit of our granular model (see Appendix B.1). In short, the granular model has, in expectation, the same sectoral trade shares as the continuous model.

Due to granularity, however, the realized trade shares $\Lambda_z$ differ from their expectation $\Phi_z$. We define the discrepancy between the realized and expected shares as the granular residual:

$$\Gamma_z \equiv \Lambda_z - \Phi_z,$$

such that $$\mathbb{E}_T \Gamma_z = \mathbb{E}_T \{\Lambda_z - \Phi_z\} = 0.$$ (15)

Defined this way, the granular residual $\Gamma_z$ is a scalar sufficient statistic for the effect of all idiosyncratic productivity draws within a sector, $\{\phi^*_{z,j}\}_{i=j}^{M_z}$ and $\{\phi^*_{z,j}\}_{j=1}^{M^*_j}$, on the sectoral trade pattern $\Lambda_z$ relative to its expected value $\Phi_z$. By construction, granular residuals have an expected value of zero and are uncorrelated with the fundamental comparative advantage $\Phi_z$, offering a convenient way to decompose the cross-sectional variation in the realized trade patterns $\Lambda_z$ into the contribution of the fundamental and granular comparative advantage.

By construction, the within-sector granularity does not create extra trade at the aggregate level, as compared to the continuous benchmark. Indeed, total imports are:

$$X^* = \int_0^1 X^*_z dz = Y \int_0^1 \alpha_z [\Phi_z + \Gamma_z] dz = \Phi Y,$$ (16)

where $\Phi \equiv \mathbb{E}_T \{\Phi_z\} = \int_0^1 \alpha_z \Phi_z dz$ is the aggregate foreign share. The aggregate amount of trade in a continuous model is also given by $X^* = \Phi Y$. While granularity does not create extra trade in the aggregate, it changes the distribution of trade flows across sectors, contributing to the patterns of a country’s comparative advantage.

### 4 Estimation of the Granular Model

In a continuous trade model, the observed trade flows are assumed to be shaped entirely by the fundamental forces $\Phi_z$ in (14), making the quantification of the continuous model particularly straightforward (see Eaton and Kortum 2002, and the vast quantitative literature it gave

19Similarly, $X \equiv \Phi^* Y^*$ is the aggregate value of exports. Due to local fixed costs, the trade balance in general is not $X = X^*$, but is instead $\Phi [Y - wF K] = \Phi^* [Y^* - w^*F^* K^*]$, where $K$ and $K^*$ denote the total number of firms serving the two markets across all sectors. Indeed, $[Y - wF K]$ are aggregate sales in the home market net of fixed entry costs, and a fraction $\Phi$ of these net sales is foreign income from exports. See Appendix B.2 for the derivation of (16) and the resulting simplification of the general equilibrium system (10)–(12).
rise to). In contrast, the observed trade flows in a granular model confound both fundamental and idiosyncratic (granular) forces, \( \Lambda_z = \Phi_z + \Gamma_z \). This poses an interesting identification challenge, which we address in this section, after describing the data used in estimation.

### 4.1 Data

Our empirical analysis is based on France as home and the rest of the world (ROW) as foreign. We use a dataset of French firms (BRN), which reports information on the balance sheets of firms declared for tax purposes. All firms with revenues over 730,000 euros are included. It reports in particular information on both domestic and export sales, \( \tilde{d}_{z,j} \) and \( \tilde{x}_{z,j} \), as well as 4-digit industry classification, at the firm level. We use 2005 as our reference year for estimation. We match this data with international trade data from Comtrade, to get the aggregate imports and exports of France in each industry. This leaves us with \( \tilde{N} = 119 \) manufacturing sectors at the 4-digit level with an average of about 350 French firms per sector.\(^{20}\)

We use tildes to denote the empirical variables that correspond to the theoretical objects that can be measured in the granular model of Section 3. The merged data allows us to construct French sectoral expenditure \( \tilde{Y}_z = \tilde{\alpha}_z \hat{Y} \) as the sum of sectoral imports \( \tilde{X}^*_z \) (from COMTRADE) and domestic sales of all French firms \( \tilde{D}_z = \sum_{j=1}^{M_z} \tilde{d}_{z,j} \), where \( j \) is the rank of French firms and \( M_z \) is the observed number of French firms in each sector \( z = 1, \ldots, \tilde{N} \). Taking the ratio of sectoral imports to sectoral expenditure, we obtain the foreign share in the home market \( \tilde{\Lambda}_z = \tilde{X}^*_z / \tilde{Y}_z \). We also construct a measure of French export intensity as \( \tilde{\Lambda}'_z = \tilde{X}_z / \tilde{Y}_z \), where we normalize exports, \( \tilde{X}_z = \sum_{j=1}^{M_z} \tilde{x}_{z,j} \), by domestic expenditure.\(^{21}\)

Lastly, we construct the relative sales share of French firms in the domestic market:

\[
\tilde{s}_{z,j} = \frac{\tilde{d}_{z,j}}{\tilde{D}_z}. \tag{17}
\]

Note that the sales share \( \tilde{s}_{z,j} \) is different from the market share \( s_{z,j} \), as it is calculated only among the domestic firms and hence excludes import sales (in particular, \( \tilde{s}_{z,j} = s_{z,j} / (1 - \Lambda_z) \)). This is important for identification, as \( \{\tilde{s}_{z,j}\} \) are not directly affected by sectoral comparative advantage. To summarize, the dataset used in estimation is \( \{\tilde{M}_z, \{\tilde{s}_{z,j}\}_{j=1}^{M_z}, \tilde{\Lambda}_z, \tilde{\Lambda}'_z, \tilde{D}_z, \tilde{X}_z, \tilde{X}^*_z\}_{z=1}^{\tilde{N}} \).

\(^{20}\)The industry classification used in the French data is the French NAF (based on European NACE classification), whereas the trade data uses ISIC rev3. We convert the French data into the ISIC rev3 classification using the crosswalk between NACE and ISIC available from UNstats. Although the French data provides a finer level of industry aggregation, \( \tilde{N} = 119 \) is the finest level of aggregation at which both the French data and Comtrade overlap. This precludes estimating the granular model at a finer level of aggregation. In matching the datasets, we have to aggregate some of the smaller French sectors, which explains the difference with the 300 4-digit sectors that we use in Tables 1 and 6, where we do not need to match to the Comtrade data.

\(^{21}\)In the model, this measure is proportional to the French export share, \( \tilde{\Lambda}'_z = \Lambda'_z \hat{Y} \), but it is easier to measure in the data since we do not observe sectoral expenditure in the ROW.
4.2 Estimation procedure

Model parameterization  The strength of fundamental versus granular forces depends on the relative extent of heterogeneity in sectoral productivity levels $T_z$ versus firm productivity draws $\varphi_{z,i}$. To capture the empirical properties of the firm sales distribution, we assume that $\varphi_{z,i}$ are drawn from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter $\theta$, which determines the potential strength of the granular forces. In turn, we parameterize sectoral heterogeneity as being drawn from a log-normal distribution with parameters $\mu_T$ and $\sigma_T$, that is:

$$\log \left( \frac{T_z}{T^*_z} \right) \sim N(\mu_T, \sigma^2_T).$$  (18)

While $\mu_T$ controls the home’s absolute advantage, $\sigma_T$ is the key parameter that determines the strength of the fundamental comparative advantage. In adopting this log-normal assumption as our baseline, we follow the evidence in HLM, who show that the distribution of measured comparative advantage across countries and sectors is well-approximated by a log-normal distribution. We check that this property is also true in our granular model, quantified under the above distributional assumption. In section 5, we explore robustness to alternative distributional assumptions for both $\varphi_{z,i}$ and $T_z$.

Estimation strategy  We estimate the model parameters in two steps. In the first step, we calibrate Cobb-Douglas shares from the data as equal to the sectoral expenditure shares. In the second step, we use simulated method of moments (SMM) to estimate the six parameters of the model, $\Theta \equiv (\sigma, \theta, \tau, F, \mu_T, \sigma_T)$. Importantly, our approach to statistical inference in this granular model leverages its multi-sector nature. We view each sector as a draw from the parametric data generating process (DGP) described in Section 3. The SMM procedure treats each sector as a (multi-dimensional) observation from the structural DGP, with parameters, common across sectors, that need to be estimated. That is, we treat the $\tilde{N}$ sectors in the data as a finite number of draws from a model with a continuum of sectors. Our statistical inference considers the asymptotics as $\tilde{N}$ increases unboundedly. We note that our baseline model keeps cross-sectoral parametric heterogeneity to a minimum, but the estimation procedure can be readily extended to heterogeneity in other parameters, provided relevant empirical moments are available for identification. See Section 5 for our robustness analysis, which allows for heterogeneity in productivity parameters $\theta_z$ across sectors.

The estimation proceeds as follows: for a given parameter vector $\Theta$, we simulate the

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22We report the histogram of the resulting $\alpha_z$ in Appendix Figure A1. In the data, the largest Cobb-Douglas share is 7.5%, the 90th percentile is 1.7%, the median is 0.4% and the 10th percentile is 0.1%. By construction, the average share is $\bar{\alpha} = 1/\tilde{N}$. In the model, we set $\alpha_z = \tilde{N}\bar{\alpha}$, so that the average $E\alpha_z = 1$, as is required by our model with a continuum of sectors.
model, compute a list of cross-sectoral moments $M(\Theta)$, and contrast them with the equivalent moments in the data $\tilde{m}$. We search for the parameter vector $\hat{\Theta}$ that minimizes the distance between the model and the empirical moments, according to the loss function $L(\Theta) \equiv (M(\Theta) - \tilde{m})' W (M(\Theta) - \tilde{m})$, where $W$ is a weighting matrix. Specifically, we search for the best-fitting parameters on a series of coarse-to-fine grids, completed by a local minimum search starting from a subset of best-fitting points from the grid. The full SMM procedure is described in Appendix C.

**Normalizations** In the model, home and foreign differ in labor endowments $L$ and $L^*$. The model scales with $L$, as long as we keep $L/L^*$ and $L/F$ constant. In other words, $L$ simply determines the units of labor, and hence we normalize $L = 100$, and estimate $L^*/L$ and $F/L$. We calibrate $w/w^* = 1.13$, which corresponds to the ratio of wages in France to the average wage of its trading partners weighted by trade values. As we discuss below, this imposes a general equilibrium restriction on the other parameters, in particular the relative labor supplies $L/L^*$, which the procedure estimates along with the model parameters. Given the Cobb-Douglas preference structure, all variables of interest in the model scale with the common level of productivity, and therefore we normalize $T^*_z \equiv 1$ for all $z$ without loss of generality.\(^{23}\)

Lastly, in our estimation, we find that the elasticity of substitution $\sigma$ and the productivity parameter $\theta$ are weakly separately identified. Indeed, the moments tend to be sensitive to the ratio $\kappa \equiv \theta/(\sigma - 1)$, which approximately corresponds to the Pareto tail of the sales distribution across firms, but not to the values of $\theta$ and $\sigma$ separately. Therefore, we choose to fix $\sigma = 5$ and estimate the constrained model with five parameters $\Theta' = (\theta, \tau, F, \mu_T, \sigma_T)$.\(^{24}\) This reduces the parameter space and improves the precision of estimation.

### 4.3 Moments and identification

We target 15 empirical moments, which correspond to averages and standard deviations of sectoral outcomes, as summarized in Table 3. With 5 parameters, the model is over-identified, and variation in any of the parameters tends to affect all moments simultaneously. Nonetheless, some parameters are particularly sensitive to specific moments (see Andrews, Gentzkow, and Shapiro 2017). We provide here a discussion of the main forces ensuring identification.

We choose to target moments that are informative about (a) the prevalence of large firms in domestic sectoral sales, (b) the intensity of sectoral exports, and (c) the joint distribution of these two characteristics. This way, we ensure that the model can replicate the heterogeneity

\(^{23}\)Note that if productivity in sector $z$ doubles in both countries, the quantity in this sector doubles and the price halves, without any effect on market shares within or across sectors.

\(^{24}\)The value of $\sigma = 5$ (within 4-digit sectors) is conventional in the trade literature (see Broda and Weinstein 2006). When we estimate the unrestricted model, we find $\sigma = 4.927$, yet imprecisely estimated.
across sectors in top firm concentration, in export stance and, importantly, the extent to which the two are correlated, capturing granular forces at play in shaping sectoral outcomes (recall the suggestive evidence in Section 2). We discuss these moments in turn.

**Domestic sales distribution** We target the average and standard deviation across sectors of two measures of within-industry concentration — the relative sales shares of the largest and top-3 largest French firms within-industry relative to other French firms, that is \( \bar{s}_{z,1} \) and \( \sum_{j=1}^{3} \bar{s}_{z,j} \), as defined in (17). These moments are important to make sure the model replicates the sales size distribution in the right tail, a key prerequisite of granularity. The combined parameter \( \kappa \equiv \frac{\theta}{\sigma - 1} \), which determines the shape of the sales distribution, is particularly sensitive to these moments of industry concentration. Given the calibrated value of the elasticity of substitution \( \sigma \), these moments are key in identifying the productivity dispersion parameter \( \theta \), as we illustrate in the Appendix Figure A3.b. In addition, we target the average (log) number of French firms operating within sectors, as well as its standard deviation. This ensures that the model captures simultaneously the large number of firms operating in French sectors with the high concentration of sales — a reflection of the thick right tail of the productivity distribution, rather than high barriers to entry. Intuitively, the fixed cost parameter \( F \) is particularly sensitive to the average number of firms, as can be seen in Figure A3.a.

**Sectoral trade patterns** We target a set of five moments describing sectoral trade patterns, a key object of our interest. Specifically, we match the average and standard deviation of foreign shares in the French market \( \Lambda_z \), and the French export intensity \( \Lambda_z^* \), as defined above. These trade moments help inform the estimation of the size of the trade cost \( \tau \) and the average productivity advantage of France \( \mu_T \). Indeed, from (14), expected foreign shares (\( \Phi_z \) and \( \Phi_z^* \)) are both decreasing in \( \tau \), while one is decreasing and the other is increasing in \( T_z / T_z^* \), whose mean is governed by \( \mu_T \) (see illustration in the Appendix Figure A3.c). We also target the fraction of French sectors in which export sales exceed the overall domestic sales of French firms. Due to trade costs, such sectors can emerge only when the ROW is larger than France, \( Y^* > Y \). Therefore, this moment identifies the relative size of France, \( Y / Y^* \) and \( L / L^* \), given the calibrated value of the relative wages \( \omega = w^* / w \).

**Firm sales shares and sectoral trade shares** Finally, we match four moments describing the correlation between French import and export shares, \( \bar{\Lambda}_z \) and \( \bar{\Lambda}_z^* \), and the sectoral sales concentration at home, \( \bar{s}_{z,1} \) and \( \sum_{j=1}^{3} \bar{s}_{z,j} \). Specifically, we target the regression coefficients of \( \bar{\Lambda}_z \) and \( \bar{\Lambda}_z^* \) separately on \( \bar{s}_{z,1} \) and \( \sum_{j=1}^{3} \bar{s}_{z,j} \), controlling in all four regressions for the size of the sector (log total domestic expenditure, \( \log \bar{Y}_z \)). We denote these regression coefficients with \( \hat{b}_\ell \) and \( \hat{b}_\ell^* \) for \( \ell \in \{1, 3\} \) respectively. Note that the export regressions are related to the
evidence reported in Section 2, with the difference that here we focus on export shares rather than log exports. These moments are instrumental for identifying the relative importance of fundamental and granular forces in shaping trade patterns. In the data, we see a clear correlation pattern — sectors with more concentrated domestic sales at the top have larger export shares, while there is no relationship with import shares. In the model, given the firm-productivity parameter $\theta$, these correlations are particularly sensitive to $\sigma_T$, which governs the strength of the FCA, as we illustrate in the Appendix Figure A3.d. When comparative advantage is dominated by fundamental forces (higher $\sigma_T$), the correlation between sectoral exports and top-firm sales share tends to be small, and can even turn negative. The intuition is as follows: sectors with high fundamental productivity tend to have more domestic firms that enter the market, due to their superior productivity draws. More entry leads to lower market shares at the top, all else equal. Therefore, with strong fundamental forces, higher export intensity sectors tend to have lower market shares at the top. In contrast, with granular forces, large market shares at the top are a sign of a strong granular draw — a source of the sector’s comparative advantage over and above its fundamental characteristics. Granularity ensures that the correlation we target in our estimation is positive in the model, with its specific value shaped by the interplay of the granular and fundamental forces.

4.4 Estimation results and model fit

Estimated parameters Table 2 reports the SMM estimates of the model parameters and their standard errors (as described in Appendix C), along with the corresponding auxiliary variables implied by the general equilibrium of the estimated model. Overall, the parameters of the model are quite precisely estimated.

We point out a few features of the estimated parameters. First, $\kappa = \theta/(\sigma - 1)$ that controls the Pareto shape parameter of the sales distribution is estimated to equal 1.096, significantly above 1, hence exhibiting thinner tails relative to Zipf’s law (see Gabaix 2009). Next, we estimate $\mu_T$ to be positive, albeit small. A positive $\mu_T$ means that France has slightly better productivity draws relative to its average trade partner, in line with the calibrated higher wage rate $w/w^* = 1.13$. The estimated value of $\sigma_T = 1.39$, the standard deviation of fundamental comparative advantage, is large. It suggests that in the cross-section of sectors, a one standard deviation increase in fundamental comparative advantage corresponds to a four-fold increase in the relative productivity $T_z/T_z^*$. Below, we discuss the relative role of $\kappa = 1.096$ and $\sigma_T = 1.39$ in generating the patterns of trade across sectors.

We find that the iceberg trade costs are $\tau = 1.34$, broadly in line with the estimates in the literature (see Anderson and van Wincoop 2004). Note that the estimated model implies that France is about two times smaller than the rest of the world in terms of population. This is, of
Table 2: Estimated parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Std. error</th>
<th>Auxiliary variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>$\kappa = \frac{\theta}{\sigma - 1}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>4.382</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>$w/w^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau$</td>
<td>1.342</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>$L^*/L$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F (\times 10^5)$</td>
<td>1.179</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>$Y^*/Y'$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_T$</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>$\Pi/Y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_T$</td>
<td>1.394</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

course, an abstraction of a two-country model with a common iceberg trade cost $\tau$ separating the two regions. The appropriate interpretation of $L^*/L$ in the model is the relative size of the ROW, in which the individual countries are discounted by their economic distance to France (i.e., if countries trade little with France, their population weight is heavily discounted). The model implies an aggregate share of profits in GDP ($\Pi/Y$) equal to 18%, broadly in line with the national income accounts, without being targeted in the estimation procedure.

**Model fit** Table 3 reports the model-based values of the 15 moments used in estimation, and compares them with their empirical counterparts. The table also reports the percentage contribution of each moment to the overall loss function $\mathcal{L}(\hat{\Theta})$, as we describe in Appendix C. Overall, the model provides a reasonable fit to the data for the 15 moments targeted in estimation, as we now discuss. In addition, the Appendix Figure A4 shows the fit of the model over the whole distribution of sectoral outcomes, rather than just for the means and standard deviations reported in Table 3.

The model accurately matches the distribution of the number of firms across sectors. The median sector has around 350 French firms with a large variation across sectors: a sector at the 25th percentile has just over 100 firms and a sector at the 75th percentile has over 700 firms. The model also fits well the average size of the largest and top-3 largest French firms, which are respectively 20% and 35% of the overall domestic sales of all French firms. The ability of the model to closely replicate the distribution of the number of firms and the market shares of the largest firms across sectors is important for the quantitative analysis of granularity. Furthermore, in the model, like in the data, average export and import shares across French manufacturing sectors are both around 35%.

The regression coefficients of the sectoral trade shares on either the top-firm or top-3 domestic concentration ratios are 0.20–0.25 in the data for exports and around zero for imports. The model matches these patterns accurately. The table further reports the OLS standard er-

---

Note that trade is balanced in the model, which is not far from the small empirical manufacturing trade deficit that France ran in 2005.
Table 3: Moments used in SMM estimation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moments</th>
<th>Data, $\bar{m}$</th>
<th>Model, $\hat{M}(\hat{\Theta})$</th>
<th>Loss (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Log number of firms, mean log $\hat{M}_z$</td>
<td>5.631</td>
<td>5.429</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>1.451</td>
<td>1.230</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Top-firm sales share, mean $\bar{s}_{z,1}$</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Top-3 sales share, mean $\sum_{j=1}^3 \bar{s}_{z,j}$</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Imports/dom. sales, mean $\bar{\Lambda}_z$</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>0.354</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Exports/dom. sales, mean $\bar{\Lambda}_z^*$</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Fraction of sectors with exports &gt; dom. sales $\mathbb{P}{ \bar{X}_z &gt; \bar{D}_z }$</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regression coefficients:$^\dagger$

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12. export share on top-firm share $\hat{b}_1$</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. export share on top-3 share $\hat{b}_3$</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. import share on top-firm share $\hat{b}_1$</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. import share on top-3 share $\hat{b}_3$</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Last column reports the contribution of the moment to the loss function $L(\hat{\Theta})$, as described in Appendix C. $^\dagger$Moments 12–15 are regression coefficients of $\bar{\Lambda}_z^*$ and $\bar{\Lambda}_z$ on $\bar{s}_{z,1}$ and $\sum_{j=1}^3 \bar{s}_{z,j}$ (pairwise), controlling in all cases for the size of the sector with the log domestic sectoral expenditure $\bar{Y}_z$; OLS standard errors in brackets.

In contrast, one moment where the fit of the model is not as good is the fraction of sectors with exports exceeding domestic sales: the model predicts 9.5% of such sectors against 18.5% in the data. Note that the presence of such sectors is only possible in a model with $Y^* > Y$, i.e. when France is smaller than the ROW. Our simplified two-country geography is likely the reason why the model has a hard time matching this moment. This is the only moment for which the model is off by a substantial amount, accounting for 38% of the loss function (the SMM objective), as can be seen in the last column of Table 3.
Moments not targeted in estimation  We consider here a series of over-identification checks by exploring the fit of the model for moments not targeted in estimation. First, we estimate the Pareto shape parameter \( \hat{\kappa}_z \) of domestic sales of French firms, industry-by-industry. Following Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011), we run the following regression on the top 25% of firms in each industry:\(^{26}\)

\[
\log(j - 0.5) = \text{const} - \hat{\kappa}_z \cdot \log \tilde{s}_{z,j} + \epsilon^c_{z,j},
\]

\[\text{Data: } 1.015 \quad [0.817, 1.208]\]
\[\text{Model: } 1.121 \quad [1.001, 1.201]\]

where \( j \) is the domestic-sales rank of French firms in industry \( z \) and the display reports the mean and the interquartile range of \( \hat{\kappa}_z \) across sectors. This provides an additional measure of within-sector concentration, with a lower \( \hat{\kappa}_z \) corresponding to a more fat-tailed (concentrated) sales distribution. On average, the distribution of domestic sales exhibits Zipf’s law in the data, i.e. the estimated Pareto shape parameter is equal to 1.015, close to 1. The model somewhat overstates the mean of \( \hat{\kappa}_z \), at 1.12.\(^{27}\) With a less fat-tailed sales distribution compared to the data, the model therefore offers a conservative bound for the role of granularity, as we explore in the following section.

Consider now the joint distribution of the number of French firms and their concentration ratio, across sectors. Recall that in the estimation, we match their properties separately. As an over-id check, we regress the relative size of the largest French firm \( \tilde{s}_{z,1} \) on the log number of French firms \( \tilde{M}_z \), controlling for the log domestic absorption \( \tilde{Y}_z \) in the sector. We report the OLS-estimated semi-elasticities and their standard errors:

\[
\tilde{s}_{z,1} = \text{const} + \gamma_M \cdot \log \tilde{M}_z + \gamma_Y \cdot \log \tilde{Y}_z + \epsilon^s_z
\]

\[\text{Data: } -0.094 \quad 0.018 \quad (0.008) \quad (0.008)\]
\[\text{Model: } -0.124 \quad 0.079 \quad (0.010) \quad (0.010)\]

In the data, sectors with more French firms, tend to have relatively smaller largest firms, however this relationship is not very steep. Furthermore, conditional on the number of firms, the size of the sector (measured by domestic absorption) correlates positively (albeit very weakly) with the relative size of the largest firm. Both of these patterns are in line with the predictions of the estimated granular model.

\(^{26}\)The results are similar for the sample of top 50% of firms.

\(^{27}\)Recall that in the model the average shape parameter is closely related to \( \kappa = \frac{\theta}{\sigma - 1} = 1.096 \), and is slightly higher (less fat-tailed) due to variable markups. Indeed, the markups are higher for larger firms, and hence the sales distribution is less concentrated than it would be under constant markups.
From this analysis, we conclude that the model is capable of capturing the salient features of the cross-sector variation in the number of firms, top-firm market shares, trade shares and measures of concentration, as well as their joint co-variation. This is, perhaps, surprising given the parsimony of the model’s parameterization, which features only five parameters. Granular forces are instrumental in generating these patterns of variation across sectors, mimicking the patterns observed in the data.

**Equilibrium markups**  We close by briefly commenting on the equilibrium markup variation across firms displayed in the estimated model. The oligopolistic competition in our granular model results in heterogeneous markups, with larger firms setting higher markups, as given by (8). However, under Bertrand competition, the equilibrium variation in markups is quite limited, as we illustrate in Appendix Figure A2. Indeed, only the largest firm in a sector charges a markup considerably above 1.25, which would be the value of the constant markup in a counterfactual continuous model with monopolistic competition ($\sigma = 1.25$).

The markup of the largest firm is 1.30 on average across sectors, and it is as high as 1.37 at the 90th percentile across sectors. In contrast, the third largest firm in a sector charges a markup just under 1.26 on average across sectors and with little cross-sectoral variation. This is almost indistinguishable from the monopolistic-competition markup. Therefore, the abstraction with constant markups used in much of the granularity literature can be a useful simplification in some applications, yet this is not the case in general. Top firms are pivotal for a range of sectoral outcomes, and their variable markups are at the core of the optimal trade and industrial policies, as we briefly discuss in the end of our analysis.

### 5 Quantifying Granular Trade

#### 5.1 Contribution of Granularity to Comparative Advantage

Armed with the estimated model, we now study the extent to which granularity shapes trade patterns. Recall from equation (13)–(15) that sectoral trade flows $X_z$ are determined by three factors: (i) sectoral expenditure shares $\alpha_z$, (ii) fundamental comparative advantage $\Phi_z$, and (iii) granular comparative advantage, driven by outstanding firms and summarized by the granular residual $\Gamma_z$. That is, total sectoral exports can be expressed as follows:

$$X_z = Y^* \alpha_z \Lambda_z^* \quad \text{and} \quad \Lambda_z^* = \Phi_z^* + \Gamma_z^*.$$

Table 4 reports the decomposition of trade flows into the above three sources of variation, in the estimated model (column 1). The other columns of the table report robustness results, which we discuss below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Common $\theta$</th>
<th>Sector-specific $\theta_z$</th>
<th>Robustness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granular contribution</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Lambda^*_z$</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top-firm sales share, $\tilde{s}_{z,1}$</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Pareto shape, $\hat{\kappa}_z$</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Granular contribution to sectoral export shares is \(\text{var}(\Gamma^*_z) / \text{var}(\Lambda^*_z)\); $\Lambda^*_z$ contribution to sectoral exports is \(\text{var}(\log\Lambda^*_z) / \text{var}(\log X_z)\).

Specifications: (1) baseline estimated model; (2) counterfactual with $\sigma = 5$ to match average $\hat{\kappa}_z$; (3) $\theta_z = (\sigma - 1)\hat{\kappa}_z$, where $\hat{\kappa}_z$ are Pareto shapes estimated in the data sector-by-sector; (4) like (3), but proportionally scaling all $\theta_z$ down to match the average $\hat{\kappa}_z$ in the data; (5) like (3), but proportionally scaling $\theta_z$ up to match $\tilde{s}_{z,1}$; (R1) fat-tailed $T_z / T^*_z$; (R2) log-normal $\phi_{z,i}$; (R3) non-granular foreign.

We first report the contribution of the granular residual $\Gamma^*_z$ to the variation in export shares $\Lambda^*_z$ across sectors, using the following variance decomposition:

$$\text{var}(\Lambda^*_z) = \text{var}(\Phi^*_z) + \text{var}(\Gamma^*_z).$$

By construction, $\Gamma^*_z$ is a mean-zero granular residual, which is uncorrelated with the fundamental comparative advantage $\Phi^*_z$, and hence this decomposition holds exactly without a covariance term. In our estimated model, we find that granularity shapes 18% of the variation in export shares across sectors, while the rest corresponds to fundamental comparative advantage. In turn, export shares $\Lambda^*_z$ account for 54% of the variation in overall trade flows $X_z$, while the rest is accounted for by the (expenditure) size of the sectors $\alpha_z$.²⁸

Since the granular contribution to trade flows is zero on average across sectors, granularity does not create additional trade at the aggregate level. Instead, granularity creates additional trade flows in granular sectors, which are compensated by missing trade in non-granular sectors, as we investigate next. To clarify our terminology, by convention, we refer to a sector as granular if $\Gamma^*_z \gg 0$, while if $\Gamma^*_z < 0$ or $\Gamma^*_z \approx 0$ we label such sectors non-granular, even though ex ante all sectors are symmetric in terms of their expected granularity, as $\mathbb{E}\Gamma^*_z = 0$ for every $z$.

Figure 1 illustrates that the effects of granularity are particularly pronounced in the most export-intensive sectors, i.e. in the export champions of the country. This can be seen in two

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²⁸We measure the contribution of export shares to the overall sectoral exports as \(\text{var}(\log\Lambda^*_z) / \text{var}(\log X_z)\). The exact variance decomposition of $X_z$ also features a covariance term between $\Lambda^*_z$ and $\alpha_z$, which however happens to be close to zero, and therefore does not affect quantitatively the results of the variance decomposition.
Figure 1: Export intensity and granularity

Note: All sectors are split into 10 deciles (bins of equal size in the number of sectors) based on their export share, \( \Lambda^*_z = \frac{X_z}{\alpha_z Y^*} \). The left panel plots for each decile the fraction of sectors for which \( \Gamma^*_z \geq \vartheta \Lambda^*_z \) for \( \vartheta \in \{1/2, 1/3, 1/4\} \). For example, the cumulative height of the blue and red bars corresponds to the fraction of sectors with \( \Gamma^*_z \geq 1/3 \Lambda^*_z \), or equivalently \( \Gamma^*_z \geq 1/2 \Phi^*_z \). The right panel plots the contributions of deciles to aggregate trade (dashed blue bars) and of granular trade (\( \Gamma^*_z \alpha_z Y^* \)) to aggregate exports \( X = \Phi^* Y^* \) (solid red bars), by deciles of sectors.

Panel (a) illustrates that the likelihood of a sector being granular tends to increase with the export intensity of the sector \( \Lambda^*_z \). Panel (b) plots the corresponding export flows, that is, it shows the contribution of each group of sectors to the country’s total exports (dashed blue bars), and highlights with red solid bars the granular contribution. Note that the cumulative height of all blue bars is 1 (aggregate exports), while the cumulative height of all red bars is zero, as granularity does not change the aggregate amount of trade. The top three deciles of export-intensive sectors account for two thirds of the aggregate exports. These are exactly the sectors where the granular contribution to trade is positive on net, and accounts for a substantial fraction of trade flows. In all other bins of less-export-intensive sectors, the contribution of granular trade is negative, that is, these sectors would export slightly more in the continuous limit of the model.

Overall, granularity shapes trade flows, and does so in a concentrated way among the most export-intensive sectors. An outstanding productivity draw in a sector (i.e., a very large firm) tends to have a major positive impact for production and exports in this sector, while the absence of such a draw in a sector (i.e., no outsized firm) tends to only have a moderate negative impact. This is balanced out by the fact that the presence of an outstanding draw is a rare outcome. Taken together, these forces add skewness to the distribution of export intensity across sectors in a granular economy.
Inference on sectoral comparative advantage  We next explore what inference one can make on the fundamental comparative advantage of a sector given the observed export stance of a sector $\Lambda^*_z$. In a conventional continuous model, there is a one-to-one mapping from the observed trade flows into the fundamental comparative advantage $T_z^*/T^*_z$, as $\Lambda^*_z = \Phi^*_z$ in this case, a feature that is used extensively in the quantitative trade literature following Eaton and Kortum (2002). The presence of granularity complicates this inference, as export shares $\Lambda^*_z$ now reflect both fundamental and granular sources of comparative advantage. The ability to draw inference on this split is important if fundamental and granular comparative advantage have different implications, for example, for the dynamics of trade flows, as we explore below.

We use the estimated model to plot, in the left panel of Figure 3, the distribution of realized export intensity $\Lambda^*_z$ conditional on the fundamental comparative advantage of a sector $\Phi^*_z$. The one-to-one deterministic mapping between the two in the continuous model is depicted with a red $45^\circ$-line. In the granular model, export shares conditional on the fundamental forces are now random, reflecting the granular draws. Their conditional mean is depicted with a dashed blue line, which coincides with the red line. There is substantial variation in actual realizations, which is seen from the dotted lines that correspond to the percentiles of the conditional distribution of $\Lambda^*_z|\Phi^*_z$. The vertical departures from the $45^\circ$-line correspond to the realizations of the sectoral granular residuals, $\Gamma^*_z = \Lambda^*_z - \Phi^*_z$. This figure complements the decomposition in Table 4 in illustrating the contribution of granularity to sectoral trade shares.

The right panel of Figure 3 describes instead the conditional distribution of $\Phi^*_z$ given $\Lambda^*_z$, that is the inference one can make on the fundamental $\Phi^*_z$ conditional on observing a realized export share $\Lambda^*_z$. To that end, the right panel switches the axes of the left panel. The continuous model is again represented by the solid red diagonal line. In the granular model, inference is very different. The conditional expectation of $\Phi^*_z$ given the observed $\Lambda^*_z$ is depicted with a blue dashed line, which unlike in the left panel now departs from the red diagonal. In other words, the sectoral $\Phi^*_z|\Lambda^*_z$ is not symmetric or even centered around $\Lambda^*_z$, as was the case for $\Lambda^*_z|\Phi^*_z$ in the left panel. This reflects the pattern we already observed in Figure 1, namely that sectors with small realized export shares tend to have negative granular residuals and sectors with large realized export shares tend to have positive granular residuals. Therefore, sectors with the largest realized export shares have systematically lower expected export shares, $\Phi^*_z < \Lambda^*_z$, i.e. a lower fundamental comparative advantage than a continuous model would predict.

To summarize, using a continuous model to estimate fundamental sectoral productivities

\[ \Phi^*_z = 0.33, \text{ the interquartile range of } \Lambda^*_z|\Phi^*_z \text{ is } [0.27, 0.40], \text{ and its 90th percentile is } 0.49, \text{ corresponding to almost the 90th percentile of the unconditional distribution of } \Lambda^*_z. \]

\[ \text{This corresponds to a classical selection (or reversion-to-the-mean) effect: a sector-outlier is only in part shaped by fundamental forces, and the less so the more of an outlier it is. From the right panel of Figure 3, note that over 70% of sectors (with smallest } \Lambda^*_z \text{) have } E\{\Phi^*_z|\Lambda^*_z\} > \Lambda^*_z, \text{ and it is only the most export-intensive sectors that share the reverse feature (indeed, unconditionally, } E\Phi^*_z = E\Lambda^*_z). \]
in a granular world would lead to a systematic positive bias for high export-intensity sectors. An estimated granular model can be used to correct for this bias on average (not sector-by-sector).\textsuperscript{31}

5.2 Robustness

Since our approach to identifying granular contribution relies on a parametric structural model, we now consider a variety of alternative parameterizations to verify the robustness of our quantitative findings. In particular, we relax the assumption of a common productivity parameter $\theta$ across sectors, and we explore the robustness of our results to alternative distributional assumptions for sectoral and firm-level productivity draws.

**Matching the Pareto shape** The second column of Table 4 reports the sensitivity of our baseline results (in column one) to alternative values of the elasticity of substitution of demand, $\sigma$. We do this for two reasons. First, as we noted above, our estimation procedure is conservative in that we target the market share of the top firms, but understate the fatness of the tail of the sales distribution, as measured by the estimated Pareto shape $\hat{\kappa}_z$ (see (19)). We report here what would be the outcome of a less conservative calibration procedure, which

\textsuperscript{31} In the earlier working paper version (Gaubert and Itskhoki 2018), we discuss a Bayesian inference procedure of the probability that exports in a given sector $z$ are of a significant granular origin, e.g. that $\Gamma^*_z \geq \vartheta \Lambda^*_z$ for a given cutoff $\vartheta \in (0, 1)$, conditional on the sectoral observables.
would target instead the measured Pareto shapes of the firm-size distribution (i.e., Zipf’s law). Second, we note that the literature has been documenting an increase in concentration within industries (see e.g. Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson, and Van Reenen 2017, Gutiérrez and Philippon 2017). One common hypothesis is that it corresponds to an increased substitutability across products $\sigma$, for example due to the increased online competition.\footnote{A natural microfoundation for this mechanism is a frictional discrete choice model with decreasing search costs over time (see e.g. Hortacsu and Syverson 2014).} Here we are interested in understanding the possible consequences of this increase for the role of granularity in shaping trade flows. We therefore consider a counterfactual with a larger elasticity of substitution $\sigma = 5.5$, which allows the model to match exactly the average estimated Pareto shape parameter $\hat{\kappa}_z$ in the data (equal to 1.02), while overstating somewhat the size of the largest firms. We find that the contribution of granularity to sectoral export shares increases from 18% to 26% — intuitively, the role of granularity increases in a more concentrated economy. Our baseline estimation can therefore be viewed as conservative. We conclude that a reasonable contribution of granularity to sectoral trade is around 20%.

**Heterogeneity in $\theta$** Our baseline model features only two sources of ex-ante heterogeneity across sectors: the Cobb-Douglas expenditure shares $\alpha_z$ and fundamental productivities $T_z/T^*_z$, whereas in reality sectors are likely heterogeneous in a number of different ways. One may thus worry that our results are sensitive to this simplifying assumption, and specifically that we overstate the role of granularity by shutting down such heterogeneity. In particular, variation in the firm size distribution across sectors is likely to be in part due to these other sources of heterogeneity, rather than driven by granularity alone.

To address this issue, we recalibrate the model by allowing for sector-specific $\theta_z$, i.e. the parameters that govern the dispersion in firm productivity draws within sectors.\footnote{Another realistic source of heterogeneity is variation in the fixed cost of entry, $F_z$. However, in the model, which is estimated to simultaneously fit the fat-tailed sales distribution and the large number of entrants, marginal firms are very small. Therefore, variation in $F_z$ has very limited effect on the key moments of interest.} In a continuous model, variation in this parameter is a natural way to obtain variation in firm-size distribution across sectors (see e.g. di Giovanni and Levchenko 2012, 2013). We discipline the distribution of $\theta_z$ across sectors in three alternative ways, with results reported in columns 3–5 of Table 4. First, we choose $\theta_z$ so that $\frac{\theta_z}{\sigma - 1} = \hat{\kappa}_z$ sector-by-sector, where $\hat{\kappa}_z$ are the empirical estimates of the Pareto shapes of the firm size distribution in the data (using (19)). With a continuum of firms and constant markups, $\frac{\theta_z}{\sigma - 1}$ exactly corresponds to the Pareto shape of the sales distribution, and hence justifies this calibration approach. Variable markups, however, introduce a gap between $\frac{\theta_z}{\sigma - 1}$ and the Pareto shape of firm sales in the model. To match the Pareto shape of the data, our second calibration therefore proportionally scales down the distribution of $\theta_z$, while preserving its heterogeneity across sectors, to ensure that the mean...
value of the estimated Pareto shape parameters in the model, $\hat{\kappa}_z$, matches the one in the data. Third, since both of these calibrations overstate the average sales share of the largest firm relative to the data, we proportionally scale up the distribution of $\theta_z$ to match the top sales share moment, as does the baseline model. The bottom panel of Table 4 and the Appendix Figure A5 illustrate the fit of different moments across these three specifications. In particular, the calibrated model can now accurately match the distribution of the estimated Pareto shape coefficients $\hat{\kappa}_z$.

Interestingly, Table 4 shows that the contribution of granularity increases, across all three specifications with heterogenous $\theta_z$, compared to our baseline with homogeneous $\theta$. The contribution of granularity now ranges from 22% to 32%. Intuitively, the strength of granularity is largely determined by the market share of the largest firm in the sector. Having heterogeneous $\theta_z$ does not change the ability of the model to match the relative size of the largest firms, on average across sectors. However, with heterogeneous $\theta_z$, some sectors end up having smaller $\theta_z$, and as a result even fatter-tailed sales distributions and larger top firms. This additional skewness ends up reinforcing the aggregate role of granularity — even if some sectors end up being less granular — because granularity is inherently an infrequent right-tail outcome, which is favored by this increased asymmetry (recall Figure 1b). Overall, this robustness exercise confirms that our baseline estimate of the role of granularity is, if anything, conservative.

**Fat-tailed distribution of sector-level productivity** In our baseline, we assume that relative sectoral productivity levels $T_z/T^*_z$ — which shape FCA (recall (14)) — are log-normally distributed. As we demonstrated, this assumption allows the model to match the data well. However, a natural concern is that assuming that this distribution is thin-tailed (log-normal) could mechanically limits the extent of heterogeneity in FCA, and thus leads us to overstate the important of granularity. To address this concern, we replace the log-normal distribution for $T_z/T^*_z$ with a fat-tailed double-sided Pareto, with $\mu_T$ and $\sigma_T$ still parametrizing the mean and the standard deviation of $\log T_z/T^*_z$.\textsuperscript{34} With this assumption, sector-level productivity draws and firm-level productivity draws are on equal footing in terms of producing potential right-tail outcomes. We keep the remaining parametric assumptions unchanged, and estimate this version of the model using the same procedure, described in Section 4. We report the results of this robustness estimation in column (R1) of Table 4. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that both models are nearly identical in their ability to fit the set of identifying moments in Table 3, with the fat-tailed counterfactual model slightly underperforming on moments 11–15.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34}Formally, we assume $\log T_z/T^*_z \sim \text{Laplace}(\mu_T, \sigma_T/\sqrt{2})$. \text{Laplace}(a,b) is a two-sided exponential with density $f(x|a,b) = \frac{1}{2b} \exp \{ -|x-a|/b \}$.

\textsuperscript{35}We report the fit of alternative models in Appendix Table A2, where we also report the overall loss function, which is 0.259 for the baseline and slightly bigger at 0.297 for this robustness counterfactual.
In turn, we find that, reassuringly, this alternative assumption leads to estimating exactly the same granular contribution as in the baseline (namely, 17.81% vs 17.76%), with a slightly smaller role played by the export intensity in shaping the total exports (48.5% vs 54.4%). This result suggests that our baseline parametrization is not mechanically constrained by the distributional assumptions to imply a high granular contribution, but that this result is rather driven by the model’s ability to fit data moments.

**Thin-tailed distribution of firm-level productivity** We next turn to assumptions on the distribution of firm-level productivity. We go back to our baseline specification and now relax the assumption that firm productivity draws are fat-tailed (Pareto). Instead, we now assume that their distribution is thin-tailed (log-normal). This checks whether imposing a fat-tailed distribution on the firm-level productivity draws could lead us to mechanically to find a sizable granular contribution.\(^{36}\) We again re-estimate the model under the new distributional assumption. This time, conclusions are different. In short, the model is unable to match the data in this case. In particular, it fails to jointly match the number of firms per sector and the size of the largest firm — understating both moments by about 30% (see Appendix Table A2). Furthermore, it also misses on our key identifying moments 12–15, failing to capture even qualitatively the patterns of correlation between the size of the largest firm and sectoral trade flows (see discussion in Section 4). We conclude that the log-normal distribution does not have enough skewness to reproduce the salient empirical patterns we highlight. Unsurprisingly, as a corollary of this failure to fit the data, this counterfactual model features a negligible granular contribution, reported in column (R2) of Table 4.

To summarize, this robustness check, along with the previous one, suggests that our main results on the importance of granularity are not driven by specific choices of functional forms or distributional assumptions. Instead, these choices allow the baseline model to match the moments of the data that are speak to granularity, and also help discriminate between parametric models. To the extent that these moments are matched, our quantitative conclusions on the importance of granularity are robust to alternative modeling choices.

**Non-granular foreign** Our last robustness considers the case where the rest of the world (being large) is assumed to be non-granular, while France still is. We keep the estimated parameters the same as in the baseline, but replace the foreign productivity draws \(\{\varphi^*_z, i\}\) with deterministic values so that the counterfactual model features the same \(\Phi_z\) and \(\Phi^*_z\) as the gran-

\(^{36}\)Formally, we take a fixed number \(M_z = \alpha z M\) of potential entrants who draw productivity such that \(\log \varphi_{z,i} \sim N(\mu_z, \theta^2)\), where \(\mu_z = \log T_z \sim N(\mu_T, \sigma^2_T)\) is expected (fundamental) sectoral productivity and \(\theta^2\) parameterizes the dispersion of the productivity draws. We provide formal details in Appendix C.
ular model, yet shuts down the uncertainty regarding foreign productivity draws. We find that this alternative has little impact on the moments for home (France), and in particular changes little our conclusions about the importance of GCA. As we report in column (R3) of Table 4, the granular contribution to French export intensity $\Lambda_z^*$ increases marginally to 18.2%.

6 Dynamics of Comparative Advantage

Having established the implications of granularity for cross-sectional trade patterns, we now extend our model to a dynamic environment and study the implication of granularity for the evolution of a country’s comparative advantage over time. We are interested in the contribution of granular forces to both the volatility of sectoral export patterns, as well as the predictability of comparative advantage reversals observed in the data.

6.1 Dynamic model

We introduce dynamics by assuming that firm-level productivity evolves over time according to a random growth process subject to both aggregate (sectoral) and idiosyncratic (firm-level) shocks. As a consequence, both fundamental and granular comparative advantage change over time, along with the within-sector distributions of firm sales shares. In this granular model of industry dynamics, firm-level volatility contributes to shaping the dynamics of sectoral trade flows and the evolution of comparative advantage.

Consistent with our cross-sectional model, we assume that there exist a Poisson-distributed number of shadow firms $M_z$ in each sector with productivity $\varphi_{z,i,t}$ that evolves over time such that at each date: (i) within each sector, the cross-sectional distribution of relative firm productivities remains stable, and distributed Pareto with shape $\theta$; and (ii) across sectors, the distribution of expected sector-level productivities $T_z$ remains stable log-Normal with parameters $\mu_T$ and $\sigma_T$. Stability over time requires mean reversion for both firm-level and sectoral productivity components. To achieve this, we assume that productivity $\varphi_{z,i,t}$ of firm $i$ in sector $z$ at period $t$, relative to a reference (cutoff) sectoral productivity $\varphi_{z,t}$, evolves according to a geometric random walk with a negative drift $\mu$ and a reflecting barrier at 1 (0 in logs). Therefore, $\varphi_{z,t}$ is the lower bound of the firm productivity distribution, and a change in $\varphi_{z,t}$ shifts proportionally the entire productivity distribution in sector $z$, thus capturing shocks to fundamental comparative advantage. We assume that $\log \varphi_{z,t}$ follows an autoregressive process with parameter $\rho$.

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37 Specifically, we fix the number of firms per sector at $M_z^*$, and set $\varphi_{z,i}^*$ to equal the $M_z^*$-percentiles of the $\text{Pareto}(\varphi_{z,t}; \theta)$ distribution with $M_z^*\varphi_{z,t}^* = T_z^*$ to keep the average realization of $\varphi_{z,i}$ as in the baseline.
Formally, we set:

\[
\begin{align*}
\log(\varphi_{z,i,t}/\varphi_{z,t}) &= |\mu + \log(\varphi_{z,i,t-1}/\varphi_{z,t-1}) + \alpha_u u_{z,i,t}|, \\
\log(\varphi_{z,t}/\varphi^o_z) &= \rho \log(\varphi_{z,t-1}/\varphi^o_z) + \alpha_v v_{z,t},
\end{align*}
\]  

(21)

where \( u_{z,i,t}, v_{z,t} \sim iid \mathcal{N}(0, 1) \) are respectively idiosyncratic and aggregate innovations, and \( \varphi^o_z \) are exogenous long-run sectoral means. The parameters \( \alpha_u \) and \( \alpha_v \) capture, respectively, the magnitude of idiosyncratic and fundamental shocks in driving productivity changes. Note that when \( \alpha_v = 0 \), the model features only idiosyncratic shocks and no change in the fundamental comparative advantage over time. In contrast, when \( \alpha_u = 0 \), there are no idiosyncratic shocks, and in particular the relative sales shares of domestic firms remain stable over time.

We rely on the following result to ensure that the properties we describe above hold:

Lemma 1 Let \( \{\varphi_{z,t}, \varphi_{z,i,t}\} \) follow (21). If \( \mu = -\frac{\theta \alpha_u^2}{2} \), \( \rho = \sqrt{1 - \frac{\theta^2 \alpha_v^2}{\sigma_T^2}} \), \( \varphi^o_z = \frac{1}{\theta}(\mu_T - \log \bar{M}_z) \), and under suitable initial conditions, we have that in every time period \( t \):

\[ \varphi_{z,i,t} \sim iid \text{Pareto}(\varphi_{z,t}; \theta) \quad \text{and} \quad T_{z,t} = \bar{M}_z \varphi^\theta_{z,t} \sim iid \mathcal{N}(\mu_T, \sigma_T^2). \]  

(22)

We adopt the parametric restrictions in the lemma to ensure the stability of the cross-sectional distributions of productivities in every time period. Finally, there is no entry or exit, but firms decide each period whether to pay a per-period fixed cost and be active, or stay inactive. Since firms do not incur sunk costs, their choice is static. That is, each period, firms play the static entry game described in Section 3, given the current realized productivity distribution, which gradually evolves over time according to (21). This offers a tractable way to extend our granular model to a dynamic environment with persistent productivity processes, both at the sector and firm levels: every cross-section of the model for \( t \in \{0, 1, 2, \ldots\} \) is consistent with the static model in Section 3.

**Dynamic calibration**  By Lemma 1, every cross-section of the dynamic model is consistent with the static model, and therefore we can directly adopt our cross-sectional parameter estimates from Section 4. Furthermore, the dynamics are driven by two additional parameters that drive the productivity process (21), \( \alpha_u \) and \( \alpha_v \). These parameters govern both the volatil-

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38In our simulation, \( \log \bar{M}_z = m \) is constant across sectors, and we choose \( m \) large enough to ensure that the least productive firms at \( \varphi_{z,t} \) always stay inactive. As a result, we have \( \varphi^o_z = (\mu_T - m)/\theta \), also constant across \( z \), and therefore we use \( \log(\varphi_{z,0}/\varphi^o_z) = (\log T_{z,0} - \mu_T)/\theta \sim iid \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_T^2/\theta^2) \) and \( \varphi_{z,i,0} \sim iid \text{Pareto}(\varphi_{z,0}; \theta) \) as initial conditions. The negative drift term \( \mu = -\frac{\theta \alpha_u^2}{2} < 0 \) ensures stationarity of the relative productivity distribution, \( \varphi_{z,i,t}/\varphi_{z,t} \), which is Pareto with shape parameter \( \theta \) (see Gabaix 2009). Similarly, for aggregate shocks, the relationship between mean reversion \( \rho \) and volatility \( \alpha_v^2 \) ensures that the dispersion of \( \log T_{z,t} \), \( \sigma_T^2 = \theta^2 \alpha_v^2/(1 - \rho^2) \), remains constant in every cross-section.
ity and persistence of the sector- and firm-level productivity process. We discipline them by matching the time-series properties of firm-level and sectoral sales.

Specifically, using the panel of French firms in our data from 1997 to 2007, we target the 10-year mean reversion coefficients for sectoral log exports, \( \log X_{z,t} \), and for firm-level relative sales shares in the domestic market, \( \tilde{s}_{z,i,t} \), as we report in Table 5.\(^{39}\) In the model, aggregate shocks affect the former moment, but not the latter, which captures the properties of the relative firm productivities within a sector, and hence is not affected by the sectoral comparative advantage.\(^{40}\) This ensures identification: the firm-level moment is essentially only sensitive to \( \alpha_u \), while the sectoral trade moment is sensitive to both \( \alpha_v \) and \( \alpha_u \). Importantly, this means that the idiosyncratic productivity process is not identified from the properties of the trade flows.

Matching the empirical mean reversion moments requires setting \( \alpha_v = 0.034 \) and \( \alpha_u = 0.050 \), which correspond to the annual volatility of sectoral and idiosyncratic productivity shocks, respectively.\(^{41}\) Since the annual volatility of the aggregate shocks, \( \alpha_v = 0.034 \), is much smaller than the cross-sectional dispersion of comparative advantage, \( \sigma_T = 1.39 \), the model requires a very high value of \( \rho = 0.995 \) (from the formula of Lemma 1), to reconcile the dynamics with the cross-section. In other words, fundamental comparative advantage is highly persistent, albeit mean reverting over long horizons.

### 6.2 Granular dynamics of comparative advantage

Equipped with our quantitative dynamic model, we now study the contribution of granularity to the evolution of comparative advantage over time. We start with the dynamic counterpart to the variance decomposition in Section 5. Note that this is a distinctly different decomposition. While the static and dynamic analyses both rely on the same general structure of the granular model, and in particular the same dispersion of firm-level outcomes shaped by \( \theta \),

\[ \log(X_{z,t+10}/X_{z,t}) = \alpha_X + \beta_X \log X_{z,t} + \gamma_X \log D_{z,t} + \epsilon^X_{z,t} \]

where \( D_{z,t} \) is the control for the size of the market (domestic sales), and \( \hat{s}_{z,t+10} - \hat{s}_{z,t} = \alpha_s + \beta_s \tilde{s}_{z,i,t} + \epsilon^s_{z,i,t} \). We target the two mean reversion coefficients, \( \beta_X \) and \( \beta_s \). We use all 300 4-digit sectors in our data, as in Tables 1 and 6, since these regressions do not rely on the match with the COMTRADE database, and we aim to obtain the most precise possible estimate of \( \beta_X \) for sectoral exports. We use a panel of 43,882 French firms that survive throughout our sample to estimate \( \beta_s \).

This is an exact analytical result with constant markups, and applies approximately in our environment, as the behavior of most firms is accurately approximated by a constant markup rule (recall Appendix Figure A2, discussed above). We check quantitatively in the estimated model that the firm-level moment \( \beta_s \) is not sensitive to the volatility of the aggregate shocks \( \alpha_v \).

Our calibration matches the long-run mean reversion of the firm sales shares for both small and large firms, which are approximately the same in the data. At the same time, we somewhat underestimate the extent of year-to-year volatility in the firm sales shares, both for small and large firms. When we target either of these latter moments, we recover a larger \( \alpha_u \), and correspondingly a smaller \( \alpha_v \), which implies a greater role for granularity. Therefore, from the point of view of the counterfactuals below, our choice of calibration targets is conservative.

\(^{39}\)Specifically, we run \( \log(X_{z,t+10}/X_{z,t}) = \alpha_X + \beta_X \log X_{z,t} + \gamma_X \log D_{z,t} + \epsilon^X_{z,t} \), where \( D_{z,t} \) is the control for the size of the market (domestic sales), and \( \hat{s}_{z,t+10} - \hat{s}_{z,t} = \alpha_s + \beta_s \tilde{s}_{z,i,t} + \epsilon^s_{z,i,t} \). We target the two mean reversion coefficients, \( \beta_X \) and \( \beta_s \). We use all 300 4-digit sectors in our data, as in Tables 1 and 6, since these regressions do not rely on the match with the COMTRADE database, and we aim to obtain the most precise possible estimate of \( \beta_X \) for sectoral exports. We use a panel of 43,882 French firms that survive throughout our sample to estimate \( \beta_s \).

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granular forces can play different roles in the cross-section and in the time series. The long-run steady-state properties of the model are shaped by the cross-sectional dispersion of fundamental comparative advantage, $\sigma_T$, while the short-to-medium run outcomes depend on the relative volatility of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, $\alpha_v$ and $\alpha_u$.

**Variance decomposition** We begin with the variance decomposition of changes in export intensity across sectors, $\text{var}(\Delta_k \Lambda^*_z,t)$, where $\Delta_k \Lambda^*_z,t \equiv \Lambda^*_z,t+k - \Lambda^*_z,t$ is the $k$-period forward difference. Given that $\Lambda^*_z,t = \Phi^*_z,t + \Gamma^*_z,t$, where $\Phi^*_z,t$ evolves together with $T_{z,t}/T^*_{z,t}$ according to (14), we decompose:

$$\text{var}(\Delta_k \Lambda^*_z,t) = \text{var}(\Delta_k \Phi^*_z,t) + \text{var}(\Delta_k \Gamma^*_z,t),$$

and we are interested in the granular contribution, $\text{var}(\Delta_k \Gamma^*_z,t)/\text{var}(\Delta_k \Lambda^*_z,t)$. Compare this decomposition with (20) in Section 5.

The middle panel of Table 5 reports the results. In our calibrated dynamic model, the contribution of the granular component is over 24% for annual changes and 23% for 10-year changes, relative to 18% in the cross-section (recall Table 4). Therefore, the contribution of granularity to the dynamics of comparative advantage is greater than to its long-run variation across sectors. This is because the granular component, driven by relatively large idiosyncratic firm-level shocks, moves faster than the fundamental component, which is driven by less volatile sectoral shocks.

**Reversals in comparative advantage** Beyond the variance decomposition of changes in export intensity, one can study the predictive ability of granularity for the future changes in export patterns. Motivated by the recent empirical findings of pronounced reversals in comparative advantage, we explore in particular the relative contribution of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks to mean reversion in comparative advantage.

In a recent paper, HLM emphasize two striking patterns: (i) hyper-specialization of exports — with about 100 sectors in their data, a single top sector accounts for 21% of a country’s total exports on average across countries, while the three top sectors account for 43%; and (ii) high turnover of comparative advantage — a top-5 sector in terms of export intensity has about a 50-50 chance of staying among the top-5 two decades later. The combination of these two facts is indeed intriguing: countries appear to exhibit extreme specialization, yet their comparative advantage tends to change significantly over the medium run. We explore here the extent to which our granular model can capture this combination of cross-sectional and dynamic patterns.

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42Note that the covariance term is zero in both cases, as by construction $\Gamma^*_z,t$ is orthogonal to $\Phi^*_z,t$ in every cross-section, and in addition $\Gamma^*_{z,t+k}$ is orthogonal to $\Phi^*_z,t$ for $k \geq 0$, so that $\text{cov}(\Delta_k \Phi^*_z,t, \Delta_k \Gamma^*_z,t) = 0$. 

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Table 5: Dynamics of comparative advantage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HLM</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target moments:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− β_X, 10-year mean reversion in log X_{z,t}</td>
<td>−0.106 (0.034)</td>
<td>−0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− β_s, 10-year mean reversion in s_{z,i,t}</td>
<td>−0.108 (0.003)</td>
<td>−0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granular contribution to var(Δ_kΛ_{z,t}):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− year-to-year changes (k = 1)</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− 10-year changes (k = 10)</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− 50-year changes (k = 50)</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share in aggregate exports:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− top-1% of sectors</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− top-3% of sectors</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover of comparative advantage:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− remain in top-5% after 10 years</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− remain in top-5% after 20 years</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Empirical moments from HLM for developed countries and our French dataset, where available. The export share moments are based on sectoral exports Λ^{*}_z α_{z} Y^{*}; the turnover moments are based on export shares Λ^{*}_z.

We report the results in the lower panel of Table 5, where we also summarize the HLM stylized facts and the corresponding moments in our French data. Note that for France, the empirical patterns are somewhat less extreme than for an average country in HLM.\(^{43}\) First, the top-1% and top-3% shares in aggregate exports are somewhat lower, equal to 17% and 30% respectively. Second, the turnover ratio over the 10 years available in our panel is also somewhat more moderate: 80% of the sectors in the top-5% stay in the top 5% a decade later. Nonetheless, qualitatively, the patterns are similar.

The dynamic granular model fits well both the cross-sectional and time-series patterns observed in the French data, even though these moments were not directly targeted in estimation. Specifically, the granular model reproduces the high concentration of sectoral exports, as well as accounts for fast turnover of top comparative advantage sectors observed in France. A sector in the top-5% in terms of export intensity has a 76% chance to remain in the top-5% one decade later and only a 62% chance after another decade. This goes a substantial way towards reconciling the HLM findings.

To quantify the contribution of granularity to these patterns, we re-run our model with granular shocks only – that is, we shut down the sectoral shocks by setting α_v = 0. First, note

\(^{43}\)HLM show that small, developing countries exhibit more extreme patterns of both specialization and mean reversion, and FDI likely plays an important role in this (e.g., the closure of the Intel plant in Costa Rica).
that this counterfactual model still fits well the dynamics of firm-level sales shares, as captured by the mean reversion coefficient $\beta_s$, yet falls short on mean reversion in sectoral exports, $\beta_X$. Nonetheless, this model goes a considerable way in explaining the turnover at the very top of export-intensive sectors. Specifically, granular dynamics alone accounts for a 10% (13%) probability of dropping out of the top-5% of export-intensive sectors over a 10-year (20-year) horizon, that is a half of the total turnover that we observe in the French data.

Finally, we find that, in the calibrated model, the extent of granularity can help predict future comparative advantage reversals. To show this, we compute the changes in sectoral export shares $\Delta_k \Lambda_{z,t}^*$ over time (over $k = 20$ and 50 years), and compare it to the initial strength of granularity in these sectors at $t = 0$. We report the results in Figure 3, grouping sectors by deciles of initial granular residual $\Gamma_{z,0}^*$. The left panel reports the average 20 and 50 year changes in sectoral export intensities. Clearly, the strongest mean-reversion forces are at play in the most granular sectors, which tend to lose export shares over time. The right panel of Figure 3 plots the same predicted mean reversion patterns in the counterfactual model with granular shocks alone. The bulk of the mean reversion predicted by the full model is due to the granular forces. In particular, in the top decile of sectors, where mean reversion is most pronounced, granularity accounts for 75% of mean reversion over 20 years and 70% over 50 years. This suggests that granular forces are key contributors to the comparative advantage reversals at the aggregate level, which we test empirically below.

\[\text{An average sector in the top decile of granularity, } \Gamma_{z,0}^*, \text{ is expected to lose on average about 4 (11) percentage points of export intensity over 20 (50) years. While large, these patterns are highly volatile, with a typical standard deviation of around 13 (18) percentage points; over 20 years, there is a 10\% chance that a sector in the top decile loses 21 percentage points or more of export intensity or gains 12 percentage points or more.}\]
**Additional consequences of granularity**  We finish this section with a brief discussion of two addition dynamic implications of granular comparative advantage, and we refer the reader to the earlier draft for details (see Gaubert and Itskhoki 2018). First, we point out that granularity has implications for inter-sectoral reallocation of labor. In a granular open economy, firm-level shocks generate production and labor reallocation not only within sectors, but also across sectors. In our quantified model, the annual job creation and job destruction rates are about 12%, of which about one fifth (2.4%) is due to inter-sectoral job reallocation, reflecting shifts in the country’s comparative advantage. This extent of job turnover, both within and across sectors, is in line with the empirical patterns documented by Davis and Haltiwanger (1999; see their Tables 1, 2 and 5). It is also interesting to note that the share of inter-sectoral labor reallocation in the overall job flows is very sensitive to the degree of openness of the economy: in particular, it falls sixfold when the economy goes to autarky. The interaction between granularity and openness, thus, contributes to the increased volatility of equilibrium reallocation, which may be costly in frictional economies (cf Rodrik 1998).

Second, we note that in the granular model, the exit of a single firm in a given industry can have a marked impact on the country’s comparative advantage — an effect absent in models with a continuum of firms. In our quantified model, the largest exporter accounts on average for over a quarter of total sectoral exports. If such a large exporter fails and exits, its market share is redistributed to both home and foreign firms. The reallocation of this lost market share towards foreign firms reflects a loss in comparative advantage. In the most granular sectors, our model predicts that over 70% of a firm’s sales share is lost to the foreign competitors, resulting in a sharp loss of comparative advantage. A single large firm leaving the industry can flip the sector from comparative advantage into disadvantage.

### 6.3 Export dynamics: an empirical investigation

Having established the properties of the dynamic granular model, we come back to the data to test its implications. Specifically, we ask whether empirical proxies of granularity do indeed predict mean reversion in sectoral trade patterns, as in the quantified model.45

Table 6 reports our findings, using the 1997–2007 panel of French firms with 300 4-digit manufacturing industries, as in Table 1. Column 1 reproduces the result that aggregate exports partially mean revert over a 10-year horizon. It corresponds to our target moment \( \beta_X \) with the difference that now we additionally control for 2-digit sectoral fixed effects. A sector that exports 10 log points more, controlling for the domestic-sales size of the sector, is predicted to see a 1.3 log points decline in its exports over 10 years.

45Recall that Table 1 in Section 2 has already established that domestic firm sales shares correlate with sectoral exports contemporaneously, both in the cross-section and in the time series. The bar of the present exercise is higher, as we test not only for the time-series comovement, but specifically for out-of-sample predictability.
Table 6: Mean reversion in exports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>Two-stage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log $X_{z,t+10} - log X_z$</td>
<td>-0.130***</td>
<td>-0.111***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sum_{i=1}^{3} \tilde{s}_{z,(i)}$</td>
<td>-0.551***</td>
<td>-0.421***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
<td>(0.203)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log $D_z$</td>
<td>0.118**</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.424**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector F.E.</td>
<td>2-digit</td>
<td>2-digit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># obs.</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2_{adj}$</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data and variables as in Table 1. Column 4 reports the second-stage regression, where in the first stage log $X_z$ is projected on $\sum_{i=1}^{3} \tilde{s}_{z,(i)}$ in the initial year (1997), similar to specification (2) in Table 1.

Columns 2 and 3 show that, consistent with the quantified model, a stronger firm concentration at the top is associated with stronger mean-reversion of sectoral exports over time. As before, concentration at the top is measured as the sales share of the top-3 French firms on the domestic-market relative to other French firms — a proxy for sectoral granularity that is not mechanically related to trade. We find that a 10 percentage point higher top-3 share in the initial year predicts a 4.2 log points decline in sectoral exports, even after controlling for the initial export level. This is a large effect quantitatively, comparable in magnitude to the one we report in Figure 3 in the context of our calibrated model.

The results in the first 3 columns of Table 6 suggest that it is not just high exports that predict future reversals in sectoral comparative advantage, but rather exports that are high for non-fundamental granular reasons. We verify this hypothesis more formally in column 4, where we consider a two-stage regression, first projecting log sectoral exports on top-3 sales share (as in column 2 of Table 1), and then using the projected log exports to predict the change in log exports over the next 10 years. This raises the coefficient on log exports nearly 4-fold, from $-0.13$ in column 1 to $-0.47$ in column 4, which indeed suggests a much stronger mean reversion force in sectors that export for granular reasons. We view these results as strongly suggestive of the granular mechanism explored in the dynamic version of our model in Section 6.

46 Appendix Table A1 reports the results with the top-firm sales share, which are again qualitatively the same.
We conclude with a brief outline of the consequences of granularity for policy.\footnote{We refer the reader to the working paper version \cite{Gaubert2018} for a detailed analysis.} A range of policies specifically target large firms. An obvious example is antitrust policy that regulates mergers of firms with significant market power. Merger policy is often viewed as part of a toolkit that policymakers use to affect foreign market access \citep[see e.g.][]{Bagwell2004}. Further, countries may be interested in targeting large foreign firms directly, for example, as part of a trade war. What impact do these policies have on trade flows and welfare? This question cannot be analyzed using standard continuous models where, even in the presence of heterogeneity, every firm is infinitesimal. In contrast, our quantitative granular model is well-suited to analyze the economic motivation and the international spillovers of such policies.

Consider, first, **mergers and acquisitions** between large firms. They are sought by firms for a range of reasons. Some of them tend to be welfare-destroying (by increasing market power and distortions in the economy), while other are desirable from a welfare standpoint (due to positive spillovers such as cost synergies and transfer of best practices). In a closed economy, the antitrust authority maximizing domestic welfare will only allow mergers with sufficient positive spillovers to offset the increase in markups. Matters are different, however, in an open economy. The increase in markups following a merger is in part passed along to the foreign consumer, creating a negative spillover for the foreign country akin to a terms-of-trade manipulation. This suggests a rationale for policymakers to be excessively lenient towards domestic mergers in export-oriented sectors, at the expense of foreign countries. Our estimated model suggests that these negative spillover effects are significant quantitatively, and are particularly pronounced in the most granular and open sectors, emphasizing the need for international cooperation over M&A policies to avoid excessive build-up of market power.

Next, consider narrow trade restrictions and antidumping duties that target individual firms. They have been regularly emphasized in the policy debate. To capture this type of policies, we use the estimated model to study the effect of a **granular import tariff** imposed on the largest foreign exporter, as opposed to a uniform industry-wide tariff imposed on all imports. Granular tariffs may be more attractive to policymakers due to domestic political economy considerations, though perhaps more complex to impose legally. Our quantified model suggests that granular tariffs are also more effective at extracting surplus from foreign producers and improving the home country’s terms of trade. The intuition behind this result is that a granular tariff on a single large foreign exporter achieves the desired terms-of-trade improvement with a minimal associated reduction in the domestic consumer surplus due to
higher import prices. Indeed, much of the granular tariff is absorbed by a reduction in the markup of the foreign exporter, as it aims to maintain its market share. A further implication of this mechanism is that a granular tariff leads to a much smaller loss in the volume of trade, reducing the import share in the targeted sector by a small percentage, and hence offering an effective way to extract producer surplus from the dominant foreign firm.

8 Conclusion

Granular firms play a pivotal role in international trade. The goal of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of the granular features of the global economy, with a particular focus on international trade flows, and to develop tools to analyze them. To this end, we propose and quantify a granular multi-sector model of trade, which combines fundamental comparative advantage across sectors with granular comparative advantage embodied in outstanding individual firms. The model, estimated using a rich set of sectoral and firm-level moments, suggests that granularity accounts for about 20% of the variation in realized export intensity across sectors. Moreover, granularity contributes markedly to skewness in aggregate outcomes, as it is most pronounced in the most export-intensive sectors. Extending the analysis to a dynamic setting shows that idiosyncratic firm dynamics account for a large share of the evolution of a country’s comparative advantage over time, with a strong predictive ability for comparative advantage reversals observed in the data. The granular structure of the world economy offers powerful incentives for governments to adopt trade and industrial policies targeted at individual firms.

By relying on the conventional modeling assumption of exogenous productivity draws, our model abstracts from an important question of the origin of outstanding firms. We see this line of analysis as very fruitful for future research. In particular, it would help better understand whether government policies can and should promote the growth of “national champions”. Another mechanism we assume away in this paper are productivity spillovers between independent firms. Such spillovers may be important in practice, especially for firms that are located close together, as the literature on agglomeration economies suggests. Analyzing the role of granular firms and their location decisions in determining the productivity and growth trajectories of individual cities (e.g., the decisions of Microsoft to move from Albuquerque to Seattle in 1979) is another fascinating question that we leave for future research.

48Perhaps surprisingly, the average prices faced by the home consumers can even fall slightly, if the general equilibrium effect from the fall in relative foreign wages is stronger than the direct effect of the tariff pass-through into import prices — a version of the Metzler paradox in our model (see Helpman and Krugman 1989, ch. 4, 7).
A Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Sectoral Cobb-Douglas shares in the data

Note: $\alpha_z = \tilde{N}\tilde{\alpha}_z$ so that $E\alpha_z = 1$, as required by a model with a continuum of sectors.

Figure A2: Equilibrium markups

Note: The bars in the figure correspond to markups for the four largest French firms in each sector and for the residual fringe of French firms, averaged across sectors, while the intervals correspond to the 10–90 percentiles across sectors. Markups under monopolistic competition with continuum of firms equal $\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} = 1.25$ for all firms, and this constitutes the lower bound for all markups in our oligopolistic model.
(a) Number of French firms, $\log \bar{M}_z$

(b) Top French firm sales share, $\bar{s}_{z,1}$

(c) Domestic import share, $\tilde{\Lambda}_z$

(d) Export share projection coefficient, $\hat{b}_3^*$

Figure A3: Identification plots

Note: The lines in the plots trace out the effects of a change in one parameter at a time on select moments used in estimation: (a) mean log number of French firms, $\log \bar{M}_z$ (moment 1 in Table 3); (b) mean top French firm domestic sales share relative to all French firms, $\bar{s}_{z,1}$ (moment 3); (c) average foreign share in the home market, $\tilde{\Lambda}_z$ (moment 7); and (d) regression coefficient of export share $\tilde{\Lambda}_z^*$ on top-3 firms relative sales share in the home market ($\sum_{j=1}^3 \bar{s}_{z,j}$), $b_3^*$ (moment 13). Black dashed horizontal lines correspond to the empirical values of the respective moments, and the shaded areas plot a bootstrap standard error band, which characterizes the degree of empirical uncertainty about the value of the moment. The $x$-axis is the normalized grid for the values of the parameters, where 0 corresponds to the estimated parameter vector $\hat{\Theta}$: (i) for $F$ we use a log grid on $[\hat{F}/2, 2\hat{F}]$; (ii) for $\theta$ we use a linear grid such that $\kappa = \theta/(\sigma - 1)$, where $\sigma = 5$, ranges on $\theta/(\sigma - 1) \pm 0.125 \approx [0.95, 1.2]$; (iii) for $\tau - 1$ we use a log grid such it varies on $[(\hat{\tau} - 1)/2, 2(\hat{\tau} - 1)] \approx [0.15, 0.7]$; (iv-v) for $\mu_T$ and $\sigma_T$ we use linear grids on $\hat{\mu}_T \pm 0.4$ and $\hat{\sigma}_T \pm 0.4$ respectively. See the text in Section 4.3 for interpretation.
Figure A4: Distributions across sectors: model and data

Note: (a) corresponds to moments 1–2 in Table 3; (b) corresponds to moments 3–4; (c) corresponds to moments 7–8; while the moments in (d) are not directly target in the baseline estimation (see Table 4). In (b), top French firm market share is relative to other French firms in the domestic market. Pareto shapes $\hat{\kappa}_z$ are estimated according to (19) for firms above the 75th percentile in terms of domestic sales within sector. The vertical lines indicate the means of the respective distributions (dashed for data and solid for the model).
Figure A5: Distributions across sectors: different model specifications with heterogeneous $\theta_z$

Note: Panels (b)–(d) correspond to panels (d), (b) and (a) in Figure A4. Panel (a) plots the kernel densities of the model parameter $\kappa_z = \frac{\theta_z}{\sigma-1}$. Each plot considers three specifications with heterogeneous sector-specific $\theta_z$, as described in Table 4, which we denote H1–H3 respectively. H1 matches average $\kappa_z = 1.02$. H2 matches average estimated Pareto shapes $\tilde{\kappa}_z = 1.02$. H3 matches average top market share $\tilde{s}_{z,1} = 0.21$. 

45
The right-hand-side variable is: \( R_1 — \text{fat-tailed } T \), \( R_2 — \text{log-normal } \varphi_{z,i} \), and \( R_3 — \text{non-granular foreign (under the baseline parametrization)} \). The middle and lower panels report the parameter estimates (as in Table 2) and select moment fit (as in Table 3). The overall loss function is in units of the average proportional deviation from the empirical moments, namely \( \sqrt{\frac{1}{15}\mathcal{L}(\Theta)} \), for a given model specification, with \( \mathcal{L}(\Theta) \) defined in Appendix C; for example, the baseline specifications misses the average moment by 6.7%, while \( R_2 \) by 17%.

Table A2: Robustness to distribution assumptions: additional details

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Granular accounting</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>R1</th>
<th>R2</th>
<th>R3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Granular contribution</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export share contribution</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated parameters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \theta ) (( \theta^* ) in R2)</td>
<td>4.382</td>
<td>4.302</td>
<td>0.532</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \tau )</td>
<td>1.342</td>
<td>1.281</td>
<td>1.560</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( F \times 10^5 )</td>
<td>1.179</td>
<td>0.771</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \mu_T )</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma_T ) (( \sigma_T^* ) in R1)</td>
<td>1.394</td>
<td>1.467</td>
<td>0.801</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( L^*/L )</td>
<td>1.932</td>
<td>1.447</td>
<td>1.377</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Log number of firms, ( \log M_z )</td>
<td>5.631</td>
<td>5.429</td>
<td>5.709</td>
<td>5.348</td>
<td>5.470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Top-firm sales share, ( \hat{\delta}_{z,1} )</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Top-3 sales share, ( \sum_{j=1}^{3} \hat{\delta}_{z,j} )</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Imports/dom. sales, ( \Lambda_z )</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>0.354</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td>0.335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Exports/dom. sales, ( \Lambda_z^e )</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>0.348</td>
<td>0.348</td>
<td>0.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Frac. of sectors with ( \hat{X}_z \rightarrow \hat{D}_z^* )</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regression coefficients:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. export share on top-firm share, ( \hat{b}_1^1 )</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. export share on top-3 share, ( \hat{b}_3^3 )</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. import share on top-firm share, ( \hat{b}_1 )</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. import share on top-3 share, ( \hat{b}_3 )</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Loss Function</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Additional results behind the robustness checks in Table 4 (upper panel reproduces the counterfactual variance decompositions), where as before: R1—fat-tailed \( T_i/T_z^* \); R2—log-normal \( \varphi_{z,i} \); and R3—non-granular foreign (under the baseline parametrization). The middle and lower panels report the parameter estimates (as in Table 2) and select moment fit (as in Table 3). The overall loss function is in units of the average proportional deviation from the empirical moments, namely \( \sqrt{\frac{1}{15}\mathcal{L}(\Theta)} \), for a given model specification, with \( \mathcal{L}(\Theta) \) defined in Appendix C; for example, the baseline specifications misses the average moment by 6.7%, while \( R_2 \) by 17%.
B Theory Appendix

B.1 Continuous DFS-Melitz model

We review here the continuous model, which serves as a benchmark in our granular analysis. Consider a two-country multi-sector extension of the Melitz (2003) model, with Ricardian comparative advantage across a unit continuum of sectors indexed by \( z \in [0, 1] \), as in Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977).\(^{49}\) We refer to this benchmark economy as DFS-Melitz. More specifically, within each sector \( z \) we consider the Chaney (2008) version of the Melitz model without free entry, in which an exogenous mass of firms \( \bar{M}_z \) are present and their productivities are drawn from a Pareto distribution with a sector-specific lower bound \( \varphi_z \) and a shape parameter \( \theta \) common across all sectors. We show below that in this model, the overall sectoral productivity is determined by \( T_z = \bar{M}_z \cdot \varphi_z^\theta \), as in (7). The two countries differ in the sectoral productivity measures, \( \{T_z\} \) at home and \( \{T^*_z\} \) in foreign, which is the source of the Ricardian comparative advantage across sectors.

Households are as described in Section 3 with the exception that, instead of (3), the sectoral CES consumption bundles aggregate over a continuum of individual varieties \( \omega \):

\[
Q_z = \left[ \int_{\omega \in \Omega_z} q_z(\omega) \frac{1}{\sigma} d\omega \right]^\frac{1}{1-\sigma},
\]

where \( \Omega_z \) is the set of varieties available for consumption in sector \( z \) at home, and the resulting price index is \( P_z = \left[ \int_{\omega \in \Omega_z} p_z(\omega) \frac{1}{1-\sigma} d\omega \right]^\frac{1}{1-\sigma} \). The foreign demand structure is symmetric, with \( \Omega^*_z \) replacing \( \Omega_z \).

Firms and productivity are also as described in Section 3, with the exception that \( \bar{M}_z \) is a deterministic mass of existing shadow firms in each sector, with individual productivities \( \varphi_z(\omega) \sim iid \text{Pareto}(\theta, \varphi_z) \) with \( \mathbb{P}\{\varphi_z(\omega) \leq \varphi\} = 1 - (\varphi_z/\varphi)^\theta \) representing the realized productivity frequencies. A continuous model requires a parameter restriction \( \theta > \sigma - 1 \).

Each firm is infinitesimal in the markets it serves. Therefore, upon entry, firms compete according to monopolistic competition in each market. They set a constant markup \( \sigma / (\sigma - 1) \) over their marginal costs. This implies that the firm’s operating profit in each market equals \( 1/\sigma \) of its revenues, and the overall profit of the firm can be written as:

\[
\pi_z(\omega) = \left[ \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{w/P_z \cdot \varphi_z}{\varphi_z(\omega)} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{\alpha_z Y}{\sigma} - wF \right]^+ + \left[ \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{\tau w/P^*_z \cdot \varphi_z^*}{\varphi_z^*(\omega)} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{\alpha_z Y^*}{\sigma} - w^*F^* \right]^+,
\]

where we substituted the markup pricing rule over the marginal cost into the expression for revenues (4), and we use the notation $[x]^+ = \max\{0, x\}$.

Firms with sufficiently high productivities profitably enter the home and the foreign markets respectively, as is conventional in the Melitz model. We denote with $\varphi_{h,z}$ and $\varphi_{f,z}$ the productivity cutoffs for a domestic firm to enter the home and foreign markets respectively in sector $z$, and rewrite profits as:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\pi_z(\omega) = wF\left( \frac{\varphi_z(\omega)}{\varphi_{h,z}} \right) \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} - 1 \right) + w^* F^* \left( \frac{\varphi_z(\omega)}{\varphi_{f,z}} \right) \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} - 1 \right) + \\
\varphi_{h,z} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{w}{P_z} \left( \frac{\sigma w F}{\alpha z Y} \right)^{1/(\sigma-1)} \quad \text{and} \quad \varphi_{f,z} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{\tau w}{P^*_z} \left( \frac{\sigma w^* F^*}{\alpha z Y^*} \right)^{1/(\sigma-1)}.
\end{array} \right.$$ (A2)

The foreign firms are symmetric, and we denote with $\pi^*_z(\omega)$ their profits, and with $\varphi^*_{h,z}$ and $\varphi^*_{f,z}$ their productivity cutoffs for entry into the home and foreign markets respectively.

**Sectoral equilibrium** Using the definition of the price index, the markup pricing rules, the cutoff definitions in (A2), and the Pareto productivity distribution, we can integrate to solve for the price index in sector $z$ in the home market:

$$P_z = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} w \left[ \frac{\kappa}{\kappa - 1} T_z - \Phi_z \right]^{-1/\theta} \left( \frac{\sigma w F}{\alpha z Y} \right)^{(\kappa-1)/\theta},$$ (A3)

where $\kappa \equiv \theta/(\sigma - 1)$ and $\Phi_z$ is the foreign share, as defined in (14). The sectoral price index in (A3) increases in the local wage rate and in the relative fixed cost of entry $(wF)/(\alpha z Y)$, and decreases in sectoral productivity $T_z$ and in the foreign share $\Phi_z$, which reflects the gains from trade (see ACR). Using (A3), we can express all sectoral variables as functions of the general equilibrium vector $(w, w^*, Y, Y^*)$ and exogenous parameters of the model, completing the description of the sectoral equilibrium.

The definition of the foreign share $\Phi_z$, and its symmetric counterpart in the foreign country $\Phi^*_z$, makes it straightforward to calculate sectoral exports of home and foreign countries respectively:

$$X_z = \alpha_z \Phi^*_z Y^* \quad \text{and} \quad X^*_z = \alpha_z \Phi_z Y,$$ (A4)

and sectoral net exports is $NX_z = X_z - X^*_z$. In addition, we also characterize the allocation

$\text{50}$Specifically, a home firm sets $p_z(\omega) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{w}{\varphi_z(\omega)}$ in the home market, which results in revenues $(p_z(\omega)/P(z))^{1-\sigma} \alpha_z Y$, according to (4), and the operating profits equal fraction $1/\sigma$ of these revenues due to constant markup pricing. Net profits are operating profits net of the fixed entry cost. Symmetric characterization applies to profits in the foreign market, with the difference that the marginal cost of delivering a good abroad is augmented by iceberg trade cost $\tau$.

$\text{51}$We note that the foreign share in (13) does not depend on the fixed costs since both domestic and foreign firms are assumed to face the same fixed costs of entry into the home market. As a result, fixed costs in this framework have little effect on the key variables which characterize equilibrium, apart from the price indexes $P_z$ and $P^*_z$, which increase with the fixed cost of entry into the market, thereby reducing local welfare.
of aggregate labor supply to sector $z$, which in the home market satisfies:

$$wL_z = \alpha_z Y \left( \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \left[ 1 - \Phi_z \right] + \frac{\sigma_\kappa-1}{\sigma_\kappa} \Phi_z \right) + \alpha_z Y^* \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \Phi_z^*.$$ (A5)

The last term is labor used in production of goods for foreign market, while the first two terms are labor used for production and entry costs in the home market.\textsuperscript{52} Combining (A4) and (A5), with (A8) below, we obtain the relationship between sectoral net exports and labor allocation:

$$\frac{L_z}{L} = \alpha_z + \frac{\theta}{\sigma_\kappa - 1} \frac{NX_z}{Y}. \quad \text{(A6)}$$

In autarky, $L_z = \alpha_z L$ due to the Cobb-Douglas preferences, yet in the open economy labor reallocates towards the sectors with comparative advantage.

**General equilibrium** requires balanced current account and labor market clearing in both countries, which (together with our choice of numeraire $w^* = 1$) allow us to solve for $(w, w^*, Y, Y^*)$. These three conditions also imply countries’ budget balances (10) by Walras Law.

Balanced current account can, in general, be different from the balanced trade in this model, as exporting requires paying a fixed cost in the destination market. Nonetheless, the two coincide in the continuous model with a Pareto distribution. The total home income obtain from exports in sector $z$ equals the value of exports $X_z = \alpha_z \Phi_z^* Y^*$ net of the fixed cost of entry into the foreign market $\frac{\kappa-1}{\kappa} \alpha_z \Phi_z^* Y^*$, which is proportional to exports $X_z = \alpha_z \Phi_z^* Y^*$, with a constant factor $\frac{\sigma\kappa-\kappa+1}{\sigma\kappa}$ in front. Aggregating across sectors and equalizing with the foreign export income, we obtain the balanced current account (and trade balance condition):

$$Y \int_0^1 \alpha_z \Phi_z dz = Y^* \int_0^1 \alpha_z \Phi_z^* dz. \quad \text{(A7)}$$

Next, aggregating sectoral labor demand in (A5) across $z$ and using trade balance (A7), we obtain aggregate labor market clearing:

$$wL = \frac{\sigma\kappa-1}{\sigma\kappa} Y \quad \text{and} \quad w^* L^* = \frac{\sigma\kappa-1}{\sigma\kappa} Y^*. \quad \text{(A8)}$$

Therefore, total labor income is a constant share of GDP (total income), with the complementary share coming from firm profits. Combining (A7) with (A8) and normalizing $w = 1$, allows to solve for $(w^*, Y, Y^*)$, completing the description of the general equilibrium.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{52} A fraction $\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}$ of revenues goes to cover variable production labor costs (in the country of production). Integrating across firms, a fraction $\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma\kappa}$ of revenues goes to cover entry labor costs (in the country of entry). Note that the first term in (A5) can be decomposed as $\frac{\sigma\kappa-1}{\sigma\kappa} = \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} + \frac{\sigma\kappa-1}{\sigma\kappa}$. The remaining $\frac{1}{\sigma\kappa}$ share is net profits.

\textsuperscript{53} Taking the ratio of the two equations in (A8), we have $Y/Y^* = (wL)/(w^* L^*)$, which together with (A7) allows to solve for both relative wage $w/w^*$ and relative incomes $Y/Y^*$, as in the DFS model. Recall from (13), that $\Phi_z$ and $\Phi_z^*$ can be written as function of relative wages $w/w^*$ and the exogenous parameters of the model.
**DFS limit** The continuous DFS-Melitz benchmark admits as a limiting case the classical DFS formulation when within-sector firm heterogeneity collapses. Specifically, the DFS model emerges as a limit of the DFS-Melitz model when \( \theta, \sigma \to \infty \), \( F \to 0 \), while at the same time holding constant \( \kappa = \theta / (\sigma - 1) \), \( \sigma F \) and the following productivity parameters: \( a_z \equiv T_z^{1/\theta} \) and \( a^*_z \equiv (T^*_z)^{1/\theta} \). In the DFS limit, the foreign shares \( \Phi_z \) and \( \Phi^*_z \) in (13) become step functions, defined by two cutoffs \( \bar{z}, \bar{z} \in [0, 1] \). Specifically, we rank all sectors \( z \in [0, 1] \) such that \( a_z / a^*_z = (T_z / T^*_z)^{1/\theta} \) is a monotonically increasing function of \( z \), and define the cutoffs to satisfy:

\[
\frac{a_z}{a^*_z} = \frac{w}{\tau w^*} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{a_z}{a^*_z} = \frac{\tau w}{w^*},
\]

which implies \( \bar{z} < \bar{z} \). For sectors \( z \in [0, \bar{z}) \), foreign is the only supplier of the good on both domestic and foreign markets, goods \( z \in (\bar{z}, \bar{z}) \) are non-traded and produced in both countries, and for goods \( z \in (\bar{z}, 1) \) home is the only world supplier.

**Continuous limit** Lastly, we discuss how the granular model of Section 3 admits the continuous DFS-Melitz limit described above. We introduce a scaler \( M > 0 \), and rewrite the price index in (8) and the market share in (4) as follows:

\[
P_z = \left[ \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i=1}^{K_z} p_{z,i}^{1-\sigma} \right]^{1/(1-\sigma)} \quad \text{and} \quad s_{z,i} = \frac{1}{M} \left( \frac{p_{z,i}}{P_z} \right)^{1-\sigma},
\]

where the granular model of Section 3 corresponds to the case with \( M = 1 \). Note that \( \sum_{i=1}^{K_z} \bar{s}_{z,i} = 1 \) for any \( M > 0 \). We also rewrite the utility in (3) as \( \bar{Q}_z = \left[ \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i=1}^{K_z} \bar{q}_{z,i}^{\sigma - 1} \right]^{\sigma - 1} \), where \( \bar{q}_{z,i} = M q_{z,i} \) are the new consumption units. Lastly, the derived productivity parameter in (7) is generalized as \( T_z = \frac{\bar{M}_z}{M} \cdot \varphi^\theta z \).

With this generalization to an arbitrary \( M > 0 \), we can now take the following limit: \( M, \bar{M}_z \to \infty \) and \( F \to 0 \), such that \( \bar{M}_z / M = \text{const} \) for all \( z \) and \( MF = \text{const} \), and holding constant the other parameters of the model, including the location of the productivity distribution \( \varphi^\theta z \). This keeps \( T_z \) unchanged. Furthermore, \( \bar{M}_z / M \) now represents the relative measure of shadow firms in sector \( z \). The ratio \( K_z / \bar{M}_z \) tends to a constant related to productivity cutoffs (A2) in the continuous model; the price index \( P_z \) tends to a constant, the price level in the continuous model (A3); the market shares \( s_{z,i} \to 0 \) so that the elasticity in (8) \( \bar{e}_{z,i} \to \sigma \) and markups become constant equal to \( \sigma / (\sigma - 1) \); and the non-negativity of profits in (9) with \( F \to 0 \) at the same rate as \( s_{z,i} \to 0 \) now corresponds to the cutoff condition in (A2). All sums (redefined to feature \( 1/M \) or \( s_{z,i} \) weights) converge to corresponding integrals in the continuous model, which is the direct counterpart to the granular model of Section 3.
B.2 Derivations and proofs for the granular model

Foreign share  Consider the foreign share \( \Lambda_z \) defined in (13). We reproduce

\[
\Lambda_z = \sum_{i=1}^{K_z} (1 - \iota_{z,i}) s_{z,i},
\]

where \( \iota_{z,i} \) is an indicator for whether the firm is of home origin. There is no analytical characterization for the distribution of \( s_{z,i} \), which are complex transformation of the realized productivity vector, which relies both on the price setting and entry outcomes (e.g., see (4), (8) and (9)). Nonetheless, following EKS, we can prove that the conditional distributions of \( s_{z,i} \) are the same, i.e. the distribution of \( s_{z,i} \) is symmetric for firms of home and foreign origin, and hence the expectation of \( \Lambda_z \) simply equals the unconditional expectation that any entrant is of foreign origin (i.e., the relative extensive margin of entry into the home market).

The formal argument proceeds in two steps (all expectations \( \mathbb{E}_T \{ \cdot \} \) are conditional on the realization of fundamental productivity \( T_z \) and \( T^*_z \), which are hence treated as parameters):

1. For any \( s > 0 \), \( \mathbb{E}_T \{ \iota_{z,i} | s_{z,i} > s \} = \mathbb{P}_T \{ \iota_{z,i} = 1 | s_{z,i} > s \} = \frac{T_z w^\theta}{T_z w^\theta + T^*_z (\tau w^*)^\theta} = 1 - \Phi_z \), as defined in (14). Hence, \( \mathbb{E}_T \{ \iota_{z,i} | s_{z,i} > s \} \) does not depend on \( s \), and \( \mathbb{E}_T \{ \iota_{z,i} | s_{z,i} \} = \mathbb{E}_T \iota_{z,i} \).

See a sketch of a proof below.

2. \( \mathbb{E}_T \Lambda_z = \sum_{i=1}^{K_z} \mathbb{E}_T \{ (1 - \iota_{z,i}) s_{z,i} \} = \sum_{i=1}^{K_z} \mathbb{E}_T \{ s_{z,i} | \mathbb{E}_T \{ 1 - \iota_{z,i} | s_{z,i} \} \} = \Phi_z \sum_{i=1}^{K_z} \mathbb{E}_T s_{z,i} = \Phi_z \), since \( \mathbb{E}_T \{ \sum_{i=1}^{K_z} s_{z,i} \} = \mathbb{E}_T \{ 1 \} = 1 \), and where the third equality uses property 1.

Property 1 follow from the Poisson-Pareto productivity draw structure and the application of the Bayes’ formula. Indeed, in a given sectoral equilibrium, \( s_{z,i} \) decreases with the cost of the firm \( c_{z,i} \), which in turn decreases with the firm productivity (\( \varphi_{z,i} \) if the firm is home and \( \varphi^*_{z,i} \) if the firm is foreign; see (6)). Given the productivity draw structure, the number of home firms with productivity above \( \varphi \) is a Poisson random variable with parameter \( \varphi^{-\theta} T_z \), and symmetrically for the foreign firms. Consequently, the number of home and foreign firms with a cost below \( c \) are independent Poisson random variables with parameters \( (w/c)^{-\theta} T_z \) and \( (\tau w^*/c)^{-\theta} T^*_z \), respectively. Therefore, we can calculate:

\[
\mathbb{P}_T \{ \iota_{z,i} = 1 | s_{z,i} > s \} = \mathbb{P}_T \{ \iota_{z,i} = 1 | c_{z,i} < c \} = \frac{\mathbb{P}_T \{ c_{z,i} < c, \iota_{z,i} = 1 \}}{\sum_{\iota \in \{0,1\}} \mathbb{P}_T \{ c_{z,i} < c, \iota_{z,i} = \iota \}} = \frac{(w/c)^{-\theta} T_z}{(w/c)^{-\theta} T_z + (\tau w^*/c)^{-\theta} T^*_z} = 1 - \Phi_z.
\]

Therefore, we conclude that indeed \( \mathbb{E}_T \Lambda_z = \Phi_z \), and the granular residual \( \Gamma_z = \Lambda_z - \Phi_z \) is zero in expectation for any sector \( z \) (see (14) and (15)).
Equilibrium system  We reproduce here the full general equilibrium system of the granular model, which consists of the aggregate budget constraints and labor market clearing in both countries. Using (9) and (11), we write the home country budget constraint as:

\[ Y = wL + Y(1 - \Lambda)\frac{\bar{\mu}_H - 1}{\bar{\mu}_H} - wFK_H + Y^*\Lambda^*\frac{\bar{\mu}_H^* - 1}{\bar{\mu}_H^*} - w^*F^*K_H^*, \]  

(A10)

where

\[ K_H = \int_0^1 \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{K_z} t_{z,i} \right] dz, \]
\[ K_H^* = \int_0^1 \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{K_z^*} (1 - t_{z,i}^*) \right] dz, \]
\[ 1 - \Lambda = \int_0^1 \alpha_z (1 - \Lambda_z) dz = \int_0^1 \alpha_z \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{K_z} t_{z,i}s_{z,i} \right] dz, \]
\[ \Lambda^* = \int_0^1 \alpha_z \Lambda_{z}^* dz = \int_0^1 \alpha_z \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{K_z^*} (1 - t_{z,i}^*)s_{z,i}^* \right] dz, \]
\[ \frac{1}{\bar{\mu}_H} = \frac{1}{1 - \Lambda} \int_0^1 \alpha_z \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{K_z} t_{z,i} \frac{s_{z,i}}{\mu(s_{z,i})} \right] \frac{1}{\mu(s_{z,i})} dz, \]
\[ \frac{1}{\bar{\mu}_H^*} = \frac{1}{\Lambda^*} \int_0^1 \alpha_z \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{K_z^*} (1 - t_{z,i}^*) \frac{s_{z,i}^*}{\mu(s_{z,i}^*)} \right] \frac{1}{\mu(s_{z,i}^*)} dz, \]

where \( \mu(s) = \frac{\varepsilon(s)}{\varepsilon(s) - 1} \) and \( \varepsilon(s) = \sigma(1 - s) + s \), as defined in (8). Note that:

- \( K_H \) and \( K_H^* \) are the total numbers of the home firms selling in the home and foreign markets respectively, across all industries;
- \( 1 - \Lambda \) and \( \Lambda^* \) are the average shares of the home firm sales in aggregate home and foreign expenditure \( Y \) and \( Y^* \) respectively;
- \( \bar{\mu}_H \) and \( \bar{\mu}_H^* \) are the (harmonic) average markups of the home firms in the home and foreign markets respectively, and hence \( (\bar{\mu}_H - 1)/\bar{\mu}_H \) and \( (\bar{\mu}_H^* - 1)/\bar{\mu}_H^* \) are the average shares of operating profits in aggregate revenues of the home firms in the home and foreign markets respectively, since \( \frac{\mu(s_{z,i})}{\mu(s_{z,i}) - 1} = \frac{p_{z,i} - c_{z,i}}{p_{z,i}} \) for a firm with market share \( s_{z,i} \).

A similar equation defines foreign budget \( Y^* = w^*L^* + \Pi^* \), which we write as:

\[ Y^* = w^*L^* + Y^*(1 - \Lambda^*)\frac{\bar{\mu}_F^* - 1}{\bar{\mu}_F^*} - w^*F^*K_F^* + Y\Lambda\frac{\bar{\mu}_F - 1}{\bar{\mu}_F} - wFK_F, \]  

(A11)

with \( K_F^* \), \( K_F \), \( \bar{\mu}_F \) and \( \bar{\mu}_F^* \) defined by analogy with the respective variables for home firms.

Now consider the home labor market clearing condition in expenditure terms (12), which
we write as:

\[ wL = wFK + Y(1 - \Lambda) \frac{1}{\bar{\mu}_H} + Y^*\Lambda^* \frac{1}{\bar{\mu}^*_H}, \quad (A12) \]

where

\[ K = K_H + K_F = \int_0^1 K_z dz \]

is the total entry of firms in the home market across all sectors. A symmetric labor market clearing condition for foreign is:

\[ w^*L^* = w^*F^*K^* + Y^*(1 - \Lambda^*) \frac{1}{\bar{\mu}^*_F} + Y\Lambda \frac{1}{\bar{\mu}_F}, \quad (A13) \]

where \( K^* = K^*_H + K^*_F \) is the total entry of firms in the foreign market across all sectors.

It is immediate to verify that the equilibrium system (A10)–(A13) has the following properties:

1. It is linear in the general equilibrium vector \((w, w^*, Y, Y^*)\) conditional on the vector \((\Lambda, \Lambda^*, K_H, K^*_H, K_F, K^*_F, K, K^*, \bar{\mu}_H, \bar{\mu}^*_H, \bar{\mu}_F, \bar{\mu}^*_F)\),

which depends on the outcome of the partial equilibrium \(\{K_z, K^*_z, \{s_{z,i}\}_{i=1}^{K_z}, \{s^*_{z,i}\}_{i=1}^{K^*_z} \}_{z \in [0,1]}\).

2. It is linearly dependent, so that any of the four equations follow from the other three. Normalizing \(w = 1\) and dropping any of the equations (for example (A11)) results in a linearly independent system of three equations in three unknown \((w^*, Y, Y^*)\) with a unique solution.

3. Substituting in labor market clearing (A12) into the budget constraint (A10) (or equivalently (A13) into (A11)) results in the current account balance condition (which in general differs from the trade balance \(NX = \Lambda^*Y^* - \Lambda Y\)):

\[ \Lambda Y - wFK_F = Y^*\Lambda^* - w^*F^*K^*_H. \quad (A14) \]

The equilibrium system can be represented by system of three linearly independent equations (A12)–(A14). Note the similarity and differences of this equilibrium system with a corresponding system in the continuous model (A7)–(A8). In particular, due to discreteness and variable markups, the shares of labor income and profits in aggregate income are no longer constants \((\sigma\kappa - 1)/(\sigma\kappa)\) and \(1/(\sigma\kappa)\).

Finally, using the same strategy we used to prove that \(E_T\Lambda_z = \Phi_z\) above, we can show that

\[ \Lambda = \frac{K_F}{K_H + K_F} = \Phi = \int_0^1 \alpha_z \Phi_z dz \quad \text{and} \quad \Lambda^* = \frac{K^*_H}{K^*_H + K^*_F} = \Phi^* = \int_0^1 \alpha_z \Phi^*_z dz, \]

53
where the integrals of $\Phi_z$ and $\Phi_z^*$ can be viewed as expectations taken over the joint distribution of $(\alpha_z, T_z/T_z^*)$. As $\alpha_z$ and $T_z/T_z^*$ are assumed independent, the values of $\Phi$ and $\Phi^*$ depend only on the parameters $\theta, \tau$ and $(\mu_T, \sigma_T)$ of the distribution of $T_z/T_z^*$. Using this result, we can simplify the equilibrium system. For example, conditions (A10) and (A14) can be rewritten as:

$$Y = wL + (1 - \Phi) \left[ Y\bar{\mu}_H - 1 - wFK \right] + \Phi^* \left[ Y^*\bar{\mu}_H^* - 1 - w^*F^*K^* \right],$$

$$\Phi[Y - wFK] = \Phi^*[Y^* - w^*F^*K^*],$$

which corresponds to the expression in footnote 19. Lastly, note that in a closed economy $\Phi = \Phi^* = 0$, and therefore the country budget constraint (A10) becomes $Y = \bar{\mu}w[L - FK]$, as we have it in footnote 15.

C Estimation Appendix

Detailed estimation procedure:

1. For given parameter values of $\mu_T$ and $\sigma_T$, we draw $N$ relative sectoral productivities $T_z$ from the log-normal distribution (recall our normalization $T_z^* \equiv 1$). We keep the seed of all random draws constant throughout estimation.

2. For given values of parameter $\theta$ and realization of $T_z$ in each sector $z = 1..N$, we draw productivities of potential entrants $\{\varphi_{z,j}\}_{j=1}^{M_z}$ in a manner consistent with the distributional assumptions of the model. We obtain foreign productivity draws $\{\varphi_{z,j}^*\}_{j=1}^{M_z}$ in the same manner.

3. With the calibrated value of the relative wage rate $w/w^*$ and normalization $w = 1$,

54 The numerical procedure necessarily simulates a finite number of sectors, and not a continuum, so that the law of large numbers applies only approximately across sectors. Increasing the number of simulated sectors helps limit small-sample deviation from the model-based deterministic quantities. We increased the number of sectors in the simulated sample from 119 to four times that (476), to limit the dependency of GE quantities to the small-sample randomness of draws, striking a balance with computational feasibility of estimation. We check that the average moments calculated using this sample approximate closely their population means. When computing conditional moments by finer bins of sectors to build counterfactual Figures 1–3, we draw a larger number of sectors (10,000) in order to increase precision.

55 Specifically, we follow EKS in using rank-order statistics for the Poisson-Pareto data generating process to directly draw the productivity of the most productive firm, which follows a Frechet$(\theta, T_z)$ distribution, and each firm thereafter, with spacings following an exponential distribution. Specifically, denote $U_{z,j} \equiv T_z\varphi_{z,j}^{-\theta}$, where $j$ is the rank of domestic firms in industry $z$. Eaton and Kortum (2010) show that $U_{z,1}, \ (U_{z,2} - U_{z,1}), \ (U_{z,3} - U_{z,2}), \ldots$ are iid exponential with cdf $G_U(u) = 1 - e^{-u}$. We use the transformation to convert the exponential draws into productivity draws $\{\varphi_{z,j}\}$. We draw enough shadow firms in each sector to ensure that the least productive ones never enter the market. Specifically, we use 5,000 firm draws by sector for France and 10,000 for ROW. For smaller sectors (in terms of Cobb-Douglas shares), we use 700 and 1,400 draws respectively, to reduce computing time. We check that with these number of draws, and over the relevant range of parameter values used in estimation, it is never the case that all shadow firms enter in any of the sectors.
and given the productivity draws and the remaining model parameters \((\sigma, \tau, F)\), we implement the following fixed point procedure:

(i) Take an initial guess for \((Y, Y^*)\), which completes the general equilibrium vector \(X = (w, w^*, Y, Y^*)\).

(ii) Given \(X\), solve for sectoral equilibrium in each sector and each country, characterizing \(Z \equiv \{K_z, \{s_z, i\}_{i=1}^{K_z^*}, \{s^*_z, i\}_{i=1}^{K_z^*}\}\), as described in Section 3.\(^{56}\)

(iii) Given \(Z\) and the normalization \(L = 100\), use the general equilibrium conditions (10) and (12) to solve for the new values of \(Y\) and \(Y^*\). Note that these equations are linear in \((Y, Y^*)\), and hence this is done by simple inversion.

(iv) Update the initial values of \((Y, Y^*)\) taking a half step between the initial vector from step (i) and the new vector from step (iii), and loop over until convergence.

Upon convergence of \((Y, Y^*)\), we use the foreign counterpart to labor market clearing condition (12) (namely, (A13)) to recover the value of \(L^*\), which is consistent with the general equilibrium relative wage \(w/w^*\), given parameter vector \(\Theta\).

(v) Upon convergence of the equilibrium vector \((X, Z)\), simulate the model and calculate the moment vector \(M_z(\Theta)\) for all sectors \(z = 1...N\), corresponding to parameter vector \(\Theta = (\sigma, \theta, \tau, F, \mu_T, \sigma_T)\).

4. On a grid for parameters \(\Theta\) with 20,000 points, evaluate the moment function \(M_z(\Theta)\), with moments described in Table 3, and the associated SMM loss function:

\[
L(\Theta) \equiv (\bar{M}(\Theta) - \tilde{m})'W(\bar{M}(\Theta) - \tilde{m}) = w' \left( \bar{M}(\Theta) - \tilde{m} \right)^2,
\]

where \(\bar{M}(\Theta) \equiv \frac{1}{N} \sum_{z=1}^{N} M_z(\Theta)\), \(\tilde{m}\) are the values of the moments in our empirical dataset, and \(W = \text{diag}\{w\}\) is the weighting matrix, which we chose to be diagonal and inversely proportional to \(\tilde{m}^2\).\(^{57}\) Table 3 also reports the relative contribution of

\(^{56}\)Solving for exact equilibrium values of \(K_z\) and \(K_z^*\) is computationally costly, therefore, we adopt the following approximation procedure. We solve for equilibrium \(K_z\) under the counterfactual assumption of constant markup equal to \(\tilde{\mu} = \sigma/(\sigma - 1)\), which is a simple analytical problem. It is easy to show that \(K_z\) is a lower bound for equilibrium \(K_z\) with variable markups (since from (8) equilibrium markups are strictly higher than \(\tilde{\mu}\), and hence price level is higher, yielding room for additional entry). We solve for oligopolistic equilibrium markups and market shares given \(K_z\). Given these markups for the first \(\hat{K}_z\) firms, we then solve for additional entry \(\Delta K_z\), assuming the marginal entrants charge constant markup \(\tilde{\mu}\). We then set \(K_z = K_z + \Delta K_z\), and recalculate the oligopolistic equilibrium markups and market shares for this \(K_z\). We check numerically that this procedure recovers a \(K_z\) which differs from the exact solution by at most one or two firms. Given that a typical French sector has over 300 firms, we view this approximation error as small.

\(^{57}\)We use this weighting to express the moment fit in percentage-deviation terms, apart from the first moment \(\log \tilde{M}_z\), which is already in relative (log) terms (see Table 3 for the list of moments). For moments 14 and 15, with empirical values close to zero, \(w\) uses the values of the symmetric moments 12 and 13. Finally, we down-weight all standard deviation moments relative to the mean moments by a factor of 3, to emphasize the greater importance of matching the average patterns relative to the patterns of variation across sectors.
each moment \( k \) to the overall loss function, which with a diagonal weighting matrix is straightforward to calculate as 
\[
\begin{align*}
w_k (\mathcal{M}_k(\hat{\Theta}) - \tilde{m}_k)^2 / \mathcal{L}(\hat{\Theta}),
\end{align*}
\]
where subindex \( k \) refers to the \( k \)th entry of the respective vector.

We use a Halton sequence to define the grid points, so that it covers the whole parameter space more efficiently than if points were regularly spaced.

5. With the results from the first Halton grid, we recompute a second finer Halton grid of 20,000 points. We restrict this grid to be wide enough to encompass the 50 best-fitting parameter values of the previous grid, but exclude the regions with the highest loss function. We iterate this procedure five times. After five iterations, the procedure converges to a narrow region of the parameter space.

6. We take the best 20 of all the evaluated grid points, i.e. the ones that correspond to the lowest value of the loss function, and start local minimizers from each of them. We take as our estimate (the global minimizer) the point of local convergence with the lowest loss function, \( \hat{\Theta} = \arg\min_\Theta \mathcal{L}(\Theta) \).

**Standard errors (asymptotic inference)** We use the standard SMM asymptotics (as the number of sectors increases unboundedly) to calculate the standard errors for our estimator \( \hat{\Theta} \). Rewrite the moment conditions as 
\[
\mathbb{E} m_i(\Theta) = 0,
\]
where \( m_i(\Theta) = \bar{\mathcal{M}}(\Theta) - \tilde{m}_i \) is the moment function such that 
\[
\frac{1}{\tilde{N}} \sum_{i=1}^{\tilde{N}} m_i(\Theta) = \bar{\mathcal{M}}(\Theta) - \tilde{m},
\]
where \( i \) correspond to one of \( \tilde{N} \) sectors we observe in the data. With this, we express our SMM estimator \( \hat{\Theta} \) minimizing \( \mathcal{L}(\Theta) \) as a conventional extremum estimator:
\[
\hat{\Theta} = \arg\min_\Theta \frac{1}{\tilde{N}} \sum_{i=1}^{\tilde{N}} m_i(\Theta)' W \frac{1}{\tilde{N}} \sum_{i=1}^{\tilde{N}} m_i(\Theta).
\]

Furthermore, note that \( \bar{\mathcal{M}}(\Theta) \) are model-evaluated moments, which do not contribute to the sample variation in \( m_i(\Theta) \).\(^{58}\) Thus, all sample variation emerges from the empirically measured moments \( \tilde{m}_i \) over a finite sample of \( \tilde{N} \) sectors. This gives rise to the standard errors of SMM estimation, which we compute according to the conventional asymptotic theory for an extremum estimator:
\[
\sqrt{\tilde{N}} \cdot (\hat{\Theta} - \Theta) \to \mathcal{N}(0, V_{\Theta}) \quad \text{with} \quad V_{\Theta} \equiv (J' W J)^{-1} J' W H J (J' W J)^{-1},
\]
where \( V_{\Theta} \) is the asymptotic sandwich-form variance matrix with 
\[
J = \mathbb{E} \left\{ \frac{\partial m_i(\Theta)}{\partial \Theta} \right\}
\]
the Jacobian and 
\[
H = \mathbb{E} \left\{ m_i(\Theta) m_i(\Theta)' \right\}
\]
the variance of moments, both in population under the true

\(^{58}\)We simulate a sufficient number of sectors in the model, so that this assumption is indeed accurate.
parameter vector $\Theta$. Note that with our SMM moment structure, the effects of the data $\tilde{m}$ and the model parameters $\Theta$ separate inside the moment function $m_i(\Theta)$, and hence the Jacobian $\mathbf{J}$ does not depend at all on the data. Hence we calculate $\mathbf{J}$ by numerical differentiation using the model-generated moment function $\mathcal{M}(\Theta)$, evaluated around $\Theta = \hat{\Theta}$, that is $\hat{\mathbf{J}} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{M}(\hat{\Theta})}{\partial \Theta}$.

The variance of moments matrix $\mathbf{H}$ depends on both $\mathcal{M}(\hat{\Theta})$ and the data, and we calculate its estimate as follows:

$$\hat{\mathbf{H}} = \frac{1}{\tilde{N}} \sum_{i=1}^{\tilde{N}} \mathcal{M}(\hat{\Theta}) \mathcal{M}'(\hat{\Theta}) = \frac{1}{\tilde{N}} \sum_{i=1}^{\tilde{N}} (\mathcal{M}(\hat{\Theta}) - \hat{\mathbf{m}}_i) (\mathcal{M}(\hat{\Theta}) - \hat{\mathbf{m}}_i)' .$$

We combine $\hat{\mathbf{H}}$ and $\hat{\mathbf{J}}$, and the weighting matrix $\mathbf{W}$, to calculate the estimate of the variance matrix for the estimated parameter vector $\hat{\Theta}$:

$$\hat{\mathbf{V}}_\Theta = (\hat{\mathbf{J}}' \mathbf{W} \hat{\mathbf{J}})^{-1} \hat{\mathbf{J}}' \mathbf{W} \hat{\mathbf{H}} \mathbf{W} \hat{\mathbf{J}} (\hat{\mathbf{J}}' \mathbf{W} \hat{\mathbf{J}})^{-1} .$$

The standard errors for parameters in Table 3 are then calculated as $s.e.(\hat{\Theta}) = \sqrt{\text{diag}(\hat{\mathbf{V}}_\Theta / \tilde{N})}$.

**Robustness to Pareto firm productivity draws** We describe here the procedure for the robustness check of Section 5.2, in which we replace the Pareto distribution for $\varphi_{z,i}$ draws with a thinner-tailed log-Normal:

1. The number of shadow firms in sector $z$ at home is a deterministic constant $M_z = \text{round}(M \alpha_z)$ proportional to expenditure size of the sector $\alpha_z$, for some large constant $M \gg 1$. In foreign, $M_z^{*} = k M_z$ for some factor $k > 1$ (reflecting the relative size of the foreign, $L^{*}/L$).

   This details are only important to the extent we need to ensure that $M$ and $k$ are large enough that the least productive firms are never active, as in the baseline. In practice, we set $k = 1.5$ and $M = 350$ (recall that the average of $\alpha_z$ is one).

2. We set $\mu_z^{*} = 0$ for all $z$ as a normalization, and choose $\mu_z = \log \frac{T_z}{T_z^{*}} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_T, \sigma_T^2)$ for each sector in the simulation.

3. Draw firm productivities according to $\varphi_{z,i} \sim \log \mathcal{N}(\mu_z, \theta^2)$ for $M_z$ home shadow firms and $\varphi_{z,i}^{*} \sim \log \mathcal{N}(\mu_z^{*}, \theta^2)$ for $M_z^{*}$ foreign shadow firms.

4. Given these log-Normal productivity draws, carry out the rest of the numerical solution and estimation procedure, as described above, to estimate $(\theta', \sigma_T, \mu_T, \tau, F)$. Check that least productive firms are inactive in every sector-country (adjust $k$ and $M$ if needed).
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